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In 2013 ICAS and EFRAG published a literature review The use of information by capital providers. This review 
was commissioned to provide independent evidence for the IASB’s standard setting process, in particular for 
the revision of the Conceptual Framework. This work was undertaken by an exceptional team of international 
academics, and we were pleased that they were given the opportunity to present the findings of their review to 
the IASB members in early 2014.
The review highlighted the need for more research, particularly for new empirical research to investigate what 
information capital providers use, where and how this information is obtained and what additional information 
capital providers would like to have. EFRAG and ICAS therefore commissioned the same research team to 
undertake a large scale investor interview based study to address the following research questions:
• Does investors’ information acquisition objective, valuation or stewardship, affect the assessed relevance 
of financial accounting information?
• Does the use of accounting information in compensation contracts affect investors’ assessments of the 
representational faithfulness of financial accounting information?
• Do professional investors assess information presented in the income statement and statement of 
financial position to be equally relevant and faithfully represented for the purposes of valuation and 
stewardship?
• Does professional investors’ decision objective influence the importance of financial reporting information 
relative to other information sources?
• Do professional investors’ assessments of corporate governance mechanisms influence their judgements 
of the usefulness of financial reporting information and, if so, how?
This report presents the key findings of the research team’s empirical investigation into these questions. The 
evidence is based on both quantitative and qualitative data obtained from a series of 81 face-to-face interviews 
with professional investors based in 16 countries. In order to solicit investors’ assessments of decision usefulness, 
the interviews were structured around a short fictional case containing abridged financial statement information 
on a large private European manufacturing firm that holds a significant portion of financial investments.
The evidence of the research suggests that participants whose objective was to value the firm consistently 
assessed financial accounting information to be more relevant than participants whose objective was to assess 
the performance of the management. Subsequent analyses show that the latter result is potentially explained by 
professional investors viewing overall corporate governance, and not single aspects of corporate governance, 
as the key determinant of faithful representation. The findings indicate that investors view income statement line 
items as more relevant than statement of financial position line items, especially if their assigned information 
objective is to assess managerial performance.
The evidence strongly indicates that financial accounting information – regardless of its shortcomings – is seen 
as a key input factor to professional investors’ decision-making. This finding is even more pronounced when 
professional investors were asked to assess the performance of management. The evidence also strongly 
confirms that accounting is not used in isolation, as professional investors place significant weight on alternative 
information sources. These alternative information sources include qualitative and quantitative non-financial 
information about the firm and its management, information about the industry and competitors, information 
about product markets, and, to a lesser extent, information about corporate governance and the general macro-
economic situation. This information originates both from the firm’s management and information intermediaries 
such as financial analysts and rating agencies.
Foreword
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Importantly, the research indicates that professional investors view the corporate governance of a firm as 
a (or even the) key determinant of the representational faithfulness of financial accounting data. Corporate 
governance comprises a complex, rich set of mechanisms that guarantee that the firm is managed in the best 
interest of its owners and includes elements such as ownership structure, auditing quality or board functioning 
and composition. Therefore, as corporate governance is generally beyond the control of financial accounting 
standard setters, that might be understood as a call for the standard setters to focus on the relevance of 
financial accounting information.
The findings of this study have important implications for various groups, including standard setters, academics, 
users and businesses as preparers of financial reporting information. The results may be relevant for standard 
setting in general and the current Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting debate, in particular, in three 
main areas:
• First, the research finds that the information objective of financial statement users clearly matters 
for the design of financial accounting standards. When investors have the objective of assessing 
managerial performance, they focus on information reflecting managerial effort and tend to discard 
information that may be relevant for the value of a firm but is beyond the control of current management, 
such as valuation gains and losses on financial instruments or changes in pension liabilities due to 
macro-economic changes. This implies that standard setters need to make explicit statements about 
potentially conflicting information objectives. One size does not fit all and differing objectives appear to 
require different measurement approaches. 
• Second, professional investors are strongly anchored on the income statement when making both 
valuation and stewardship decisions. They have strong reservations about the representational 
faithfulness of bottom line figures being negatively affected by managerial estimates and judgments 
triggered by re-valuations that relate to balance sheet line items.
• Third, the finding that professional investors view the corporate governance of a firm as highly influential 
over the representational faithfulness of financial reporting data needs to be borne in mind when 
designing standards to ensure that each complements the other.
It is pleasing that so many users who are involved in the user outreach activities of EFRAG and ICAS volunteered 
to be interviewed by the research team, and thereby have made an essential and valuable contribution to this 
research.
This independent academic research was supported by ICAS and EFRAG. Both bodies consider the findings as 
highly valuable input for their understanding of financial reporting users’ needs. In addition, ICAS and EFRAG 
hope that the report will assist the IASB in its finalisation of the Conceptual Framework and more generally in 
the future evolution of IFRS.
Allister Wilson  
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Study objectives and background
A recent review of the academic literature for ICAS and EFRAG (Cascino et al., 2013) concluded that there 
are two main roles for financial reporting. The first is to provide information for estimating the future cash 
flows associated with both debt and equity capital, often referred to as the valuation role. The second is the 
stewardship role, where financial reporting information is used in the preservation of investors’ capital and in 
the control and incentivisation of managers. The downgrading of stewardship as a primary objective in the 
joint 2010 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting generated significant debate and disquiet in the professional, 
regulatory and academic accounting communities. Despite the significance of this debate, the 2013 ICAS 
and EFRAG sponsored review of the literature showed that there is a lack of direct empirical evidence on the 
stewardship role and whether it requires information with different properties to that required for estimating 
future cash flows. This report aims to address this gap by providing empirical evidence on professional 
investors’ assessments of the usefulness of financial reporting information for both valuation and stewardship 
decisions. Evidence-based research on the decision usefulness of financial reporting information is particularly 
timely, given the current developments of the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting.
The literature acknowledges that in many cases, setting valuation objectives for financial reporting results 
in information that is useful for stewardship decisions. For instance, investment value is of primary concern 
to capital providers and will also form an important part of managerial performance assessments. However, 
theoretical studies also show that the two objectives sometimes require information with different properties. 
This is particularly the case where information on future cash flows is relevant for valuation irrespective of 
whether it reflects the effort of managers, whereas a stewardship objective typically sees information reflecting 
events outside managers’ control as irrelevant. Indeed, one of the arguments against share prices being 
included in managerial performance arrangements is that they are influenced by factors outside management 
control, such as macro-economic changes. Moreover, share prices contain significant forward looking 
information and are therefore influenced by expectations of future outcomes, not just realisations of actual 
outcomes. Because it can be more informative of managers’ actions than share prices, financial reporting 
information is often used in executive compensation arrangements in an attempt to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers. However, these arrangements may threaten the neutrality of financial reporting 
information because those responsible for preparing the information are being rewarded on the basis of what 
they report. Managers therefore have incentives to produce information that serves their interests rather 
than faithfully informs investors about the firm’s financial position and performance. In short, prior literature 
indicates that a stewardship objective prioritises financial reporting data that are informative about managerial 
performance and requires more verifiable information with enhanced credibility from independent certification 
by auditors. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which the use of financial reporting information 
for incentivising management affects assessments of its decision usefulness, particularly its representational 
faithfulness.
Prior research comparing stewardship and valuation objectives often assumes that financial reporting systems 
are only capable of producing one ‘signal’ to investors. This is unrealistic because investors are presented 
with multiple measures of financial performance and financial position in the various financial statements 
companies prepare. The current mixed measurement model for financial reporting produces information 
across (and within) different financial statements with different properties (such as the level of managerial 
judgement involved and the degree of verifiability). Furthermore, an assessment of the decision usefulness 
of financial reporting for different objectives needs to recognise that investors have a range of information 
sources at their disposal, both within and outside the financial reporting system.
Executive summary
8Professional investors and the decision usefulness of financial reporting - EFRAG - ICAS Report
The literature also indicates that companies’ corporate governance mechanisms can strongly influence 
the properties of financial reporting information. Mechanisms such as the external audit and having an 
independent board of directors have evolved over time to complement (and/or substitute for) financial 
reporting information. Hence, even where compensation arrangements may lead to incentives to produce 
financial reporting information that is not faithfully representative, professional investors may assess preparers’ 
corporate governance characteristics to be sufficiently robust to guard against biased reporting.
Research questions
This study addresses the following questions:
• Does investors’ information acquisition objective, valuation or stewardship, affect the 
 assessed relevance of financial accounting information?
• Does the use of accounting information in compensation contracts affect investors’ 
 assessments of the representational faithfulness of financial accounting information?
• Do professional investors assess information presented in the income statement and 
 statement of financial position to be equally relevant and faithfully represented for the 
 purposes of valuation and stewardship?
• Does professional investors’ decision objective influence the importance of financial 
 reporting information relative to other information sources?
• Do professional investors’ assessments of corporate governance mechanisms influence 
 their judgements of the usefulness of financial reporting information and, if so, how?
Summary of research approach
In order to investigate these issues, a large international face-to-face interview study of 81 professional 
investors was conducted. Participants were provided with a short case study including summary financial 
reporting and corporate governance information on a fictional private (i.e., unlisted) European manufacturing 
company. They were then asked to provide numerical assessments of the usefulness of financial reporting 
(and other) information for their decision making and to explain their choices.
Participants were given the same case study but were randomly assigned to one of four ‘conditions’. 
Specifically, half of the sample was given an objective of valuing the firm (the valuation objective), whereas 
the other half was asked to assess managerial performance (the stewardship objective). The sample was 
also randomly split in half according to whether managerial compensation in the case was awarded based 
on either accounting or non-accounting data. Hence, each investor was randomly assigned to the same case 
study under one of the following four conditions:
(i) valuation objective with managerial compensation linked to non-accounting data
(ii) stewardship objective with managerial compensation linked to non-accounting data
(iii) valuation objective with managerial compensation linked to accounting data
(iv) stewardship objective with managerial compensation linked to accounting data.
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Providing investors with an identical case under these four different conditions should ensure that observed 
differences between their responses are attributable only to differences in the objectives of the information 
(i.e., valuation or stewardship) and/or whether or not accounting data are used for determining executive 
compensation.
The research design allowed for the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data 
were collected through the use of ‘Likert’ scales where investors were asked on a scale of 1 to 7 whether they 
strongly agreed or strongly disagreed with statements about the relevance and representational faithfulness of 
various line items in the summary financial statements and about the case company’s corporate governance. 
Qualitative data were collected when participants were prompted to discuss the rationales for their quantitative 
choices. Demographic data (e.g., on interviewees’ occupation, experience and accounting qualifications) 
were also obtained in order to control for any possible effects on their responses. Finally, participants were 
asked for their views of alternative sources to financial reporting information.
Findings
The results indicate that objectives do matter. Professional investors whose objective was to value the company 
assessed financial accounting information to be more relevant than those assessing the performance of 
management. This result pertains to financial reporting information overall and for individual line items in the 
financial statements. In contrast, the existence of accounting-based managerial compensation arrangements 
had no significant effect on professional investors’ assessments of the representational faithfulness of financial 
reporting information. 
In line with prior research, the study finds that professional investors view information in the income statement 
as more relevant than balance sheet line items, especially where investors’ objective is to assess the 
performance of management. The qualitative analysis suggests that, regardless of their objective, investors 
are concerned with discretion and managerial judgement for certain balance sheet line items (such as fair 
values) and, consequently, information in the income statement as well (such as changes in fair values).
Turning to the alternative information sources that professional investors use, in line with prior studies and 
despite the major changes to the information environment in recent years, professional investors view financial 
reporting information as a primary input to their decisions, even though they are aware of its shortcomings. 
This judgement is even more pronounced when their objective is to assess managerial performance and 
where there are relatively fewer alternative information sources available. Alternative information sources are 
sometimes obtained directly from the firm and from third-party sources. Such sources include qualitative 
and quantitative non-financial information about the firm and its management, information about the industry 
and competitors, information about product markets, and, to a lesser degree, information about corporate 
governance and the general macro-economic environment.
Both qualitative and quantitative results from the study indicate that professional investors’ assessments 
of corporate governance mechanisms significantly affect how they view financial reporting information. In 
particular, investors seem aware of the risks to representational faithfulness posed by linking managerial 
compensation to accounting data (e.g., that it may amplify preparers’ tendencies to manage earnings), yet 
they are less concerned about these risks when they judge overall corporate governance mechanisms to be 
sound.
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Implications of findings and recommendations
The findings of this study have important implications for various groups, including standard setters, 
academics, users and preparers of financial reporting information. Results may be relevant for standard 
setting in general and the current Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting debate, in particular, in 
three main areas. First, the research finds that the information objective of financial statement users clearly 
matters for the design of financial accounting standards. As is predicted by theory, when investors have the 
objective of assessing managerial performance, they focus on information reflecting managerial effort and 
tend to discard information that may be relevant for the value of a firm but is beyond the control of current 
management. Examples include valuation gains and losses on financial instruments or changes in pension 
liabilities that may be due to macro-economic changes. This implies that standard setters need to make 
explicit statements about potentially conflicting information objectives. One size does not fit all and differing 
objectives appear to require different measurement approaches.
Balancing these competing objectives of financial reporting, it seems relevant that professional investors 
require financial accounting information relatively more than other sources of information when they are 
assigned a stewardship objective. This indicates that financial accounting information may have a competitive 
advantage over other information sources when professional investors are assessing stewardship and that 
there are fewer alternatives to choose from for stewardship purposes. The properties of information used for 
stewardship, such as high levels of verifiability and informativeness about management effort therefore need 
promotion and protection.
Second, confirming the results of prior literature, professional investors are strongly anchored on the income 
statement when making both valuation and stewardship decisions. They have strong reservations about the 
representational faithfulness of bottom line figures being negatively affected by managerial estimates and 
judgements triggered by re-valuations that relate to balance sheet line items. This leads to increased reliance 
on non-GAAP measures (such as EBITDA), which in turn raises concerns about a lack of standardisation and 
comparability and supports a call for the development of a standardised set of performance measures to suit 
differing objectives.
Finally, the finding that professional investors view the corporate governance of a firm as highly influential 
over the representational faithfulness of financial reporting data needs to be borne in mind when designing 
standards to ensure that governance and financial reporting are complementary. For instance, different 
recognition and measurement rules have different governance ‘costs’ to ensure faithful representation: 
historical cost measures are comparatively easy to test for completeness and neutrality, whereas pension 
liabilities and level three fair value measurements (i.e. ‘mark-to-model’, where market prices cannot be 
obtained) of financial instruments may require a more complex and costly corporate governance regime 
to ensure that they are faithfully represented. Given that standard setters cater to a wide array of divergent 
preparers, from small and mid-sized private entities to global listed conglomerates, it seems reasonable 
to consider the potential requirements for corporate governance and enforcement when evaluating the 
desirability of potential accounting standards and concepts. Therefore, it might well be appropriate to cater 
to different firm types when developing standards.
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In providing direct empirical evidence that different objectives of financial reporting affect professional 
investors’ assessments of relevance and faithful representation, the study also contributes to the academic 
literature. It confirms theoretical research results that users consider the influence managers have over different 
types of information when making stewardship decisions. In particular, investors are aware that the changes 
in the accounting values of some items are beyond the control of management and they do not regard it 
as appropriate to reward or penalise managers on the basis of this information. The study also indicates 
that while accounting data are regarded as highly relevant in valuation, the lack of superior alternatives for 
assessing and compensating management makes accounting information particularly important to investors 
in making stewardship decisions. This latter finding is worthy of further research.
Finally, the study has important implications for preparers of financial reporting information. The findings 
suggest that providers of capital are well aware that managerial compensation can, inter alia, create incentives 
for earnings management; however, strong overall mechanisms of corporate governance – particularly audit – 
can ameliorate such concerns, meaning that investment in high quality governance may well pay.
12
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INTRODUCTION
A 2013 review of the academic literature (Cascino et al., 2013) for ICAS and EFRAG concluded that financial 
reporting is generally regarded as performing two main roles. The first can be described as a valuation or 
pricing role, where financial reporting is used in predicting future cash flows, typically to arrive at an estimate 
of the fundamental value of the firm or its debt and/or equity securities (Beyer et al., 2010). The second, usually 
labelled the stewardship or contracting role, is one involving control and accountability, where accounting 
information is employed in firms’ contracts, monitoring and governance processes, often with a view to 
preserving capital and influencing future cash flows (e.g., Bushman and Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001; 2010; 
Lennard, 2007). This typically takes place as part of assessments of managerial performance and accounting-
based compensation arrangements.
In relegating the stewardship objective for financial reporting in their joint 2010 Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting, the IASB and FASB reignited one of the most fundamental and enduring debates in 
accounting (see Murphy et al., 2013 for a discussion). The 2015 Exposure Draft of the IASB’s Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting (Conceptual Framework Exposure Draft) devotes more attention to 
stewardship, though it is still not separately defined and remains a subset of a broader ‘decision usefulness’ 
objective. The decision usefulness objective is where information is designed to be useful for investment 
decisions, though these decisions are characterised as depending in part upon stewardship assessments. 
While some constituencies have been persuaded that a single decision usefulness objective for accounting 
can, at least to a reasonable extent, form the basis of a common set of standards that will satisfy most users 
of financial reporting information, others have argued that removing an emphasis on stewardship may have 
widespread economic implications (e.g., Kothari et al., 2010).
The Conceptual Framework Exposure Draft deliberations have also drawn attention to the relative importance 
of the statement of financial position (or balance sheet) as compared with the income statement.1 The IASB 
emphasises the former via the elementary primacy given to assets and liabilities over income and expenses.2 
An increased focus on the balance sheet has resulted in heightened concerns over the increased use of 
fair values and changes in reported performance measures, in particular whether comprehensive income is 
prioritised over profit or loss as the primary measure of performance (e.g., Thinggaard et al., 2006; Dichev, 
2008; Whittington, 2008a).
The aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence to help inform these important debates. It first investigates 
whether professional investors’ assessments of financial accounting information are shaped by their use of 
the information to value the firm or to assess the performance of management. While there are many areas 
where the two objectives overlap, prior research points to areas where each may require information with 
different properties to the other (Lambert, 1993; 2001; Armstrong et al., 2010). This research is discussed in 
more detail below.
According to the 2010 Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, relevance (information’s capability to 
influence users’ decisions) and faithful representation (information that is complete, neutral and free from 
errors) are the two fundamental qualities that make information decision useful. In addition to examining how 
investors judge both the relevance and representational faithfulness of financial reporting information overall, 
this study examines assessments of various financial statement line items, together with alternative sources 
of information. Finally, it investigates investors’ assessments of the extent to which companies’ corporate 
governance mechanisms reduce perceived limitations of accounting data.
Chapter 1
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The study involves a large-scale international face-to-face survey of professional investors, centred on a 
fictional case study designed to draw out patterns of information usage under valuation and stewardship 
conditions. The focus on professional investors reflects their importance both as major providers of capital 
and as target users of financial reporting information (Cascino et al., 2013). The research uses both quantitative 
and qualitative data from the interview survey to address the following questions:
• Does investors’ information acquisition objective, valuation or stewardship, affect the assessed 
relevance of financial accounting information?
• Does the use of accounting information in compensation contracts affect investors’ assessments of the 
representational faithfulness of financial accounting information?
• Do professional investors assess information presented in the income statement and statement of 
financial position to be equally relevant and faithfully represented for the purposes of valuation and 
stewardship?
• Does professional investors’ decision objective influence the importance of financial reporting 
information relative to other information sources?
• Do professional investors’ assessments of corporate governance mechanisms influence their 
judgements of the usefulness of financial reporting information and, if so, how?
The next chapter of the report briefly outlines some of the academic literature on the relative importance of 
the valuation and stewardship objectives of financial reporting, the use of accounting and non-accounting 
information sources by professional investors and the importance of corporate governance. Chapter 3 presents 
the research design and methodology, followed by the results in Chapter 4. Finally, the report concludes with 
a summary and a discussion of the implications of the findings for accounting standard setters, preparers and 
academic researchers.
14
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BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE
It is widely accepted in the academic literature that despite its inherent limitations, financial reporting is 
among the most influential sources of information used by capital providers. There is also recognition that 
the ways in which accounting information is used often varies by type of investor and sometimes for different 
decisions by the same type of investor (e.g., Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Armstrong et al., 2010; Cascino et 
al., 2013; 2014). Despite this theoretical literature, it remains unclear the extent to which investors in day-to-
day situations demand information with different properties and, in particular, whether information designed 
for valuation and estimating future cash flows will, necessarily, be useful for informing stewardship decisions. 
While a wealth of evidence identifies cases where information needs differ, some studies point to a strong 
positive relationship between valuation and stewardship measures of accounting usefulness (e.g., Bushman 
et al., 2006). The following sections outline and discuss in more depth some of the prior literature on these 
issues.
The use of financial reporting information in valuation
Given that valuation (sometimes referred to as ‘decision usefulness’)3 is seen as the dominant role of 
contemporary financial reporting (e.g., Zeff, 2013), it is unsurprising that financial statements have consistently 
been found to be very useful to professional investors when valuing a firm and its securities. This finding 
prevails across time and countries, regardless of investor type and the research methodology used (see 
Cascino et al., 2013; 2014 for a review). Even where investors do not use audited financial accounting data 
directly, they will often do so indirectly – for instance via sell-side analysts’ research (e.g., Brown et al., 2014) 
or through data aggregators, such as Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and others.
In general, accounting information represents one of the primary inputs into investors’ valuation models, 
whose purpose is to arrive at an estimate of the fundamental value of the firm and/or its securities. Such 
models typically require predictions of future earnings, book values and/or cash flows and despite its lack of 
timeliness and historical focus, accounting information usually forms the basis of such forecasts. However, 
research points to changes over time and to variation by firm type, with multi-period intrinsic models (such as 
those based on discounted cash flows) being more widely used in more recent years and in industries where 
accounting information (particularly the balance sheet) may not capture a large share of the firm’s operating 
activities, such as pharmaceuticals and technology firms (Demirakos et al., 2004; Imam et al., 2008).4
Despite the increased focus on the statement of financial position in standard setting, professional investors 
continue to rely more on earnings-based models, such as the price/earnings, EV/EBITDA and PEG multiples 
(e.g., Barker, 1999; Imam et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2014).5 This suggests that investors (outside the financial 
services industry at least) are more focused on the income statement than on the statement of financial 
position; however, the extent to which particular accounting figures are used appears to depend not just on 
the industry of the company, but also on the measurement basis used to prepare the financial statements and 
the particular performance measure used. The limited available evidence shows that investors consider fair 
value to be more useful than historical cost for certain types of assets (especially for liquid and non-operating 
assets), though mark-to-model (i.e., level three) fair value measurement is viewed as significantly less useful 
(Gassen and Schwedler, 2010). Plantin et al. (2009) find that mark-to-market fair value measurement (i.e., 
where market prices can be obtained) can also be problematic in some cases, particularly for long-lived, 
illiquid and senior assets.
Chapter 2
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The focus of investors on the income statement is also dependent on the properties of the performance 
measure used. It is generally accepted that professional investors prefer profit measures that are ‘persistent’ 
or ‘recurring’ as this enhances the predictive value of the information (e.g., Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Callen, 
2009). On the other hand, the theoretical literature on earning-based models emphasises the need for income 
measures to conform to the clean surplus relation (e.g., Peasnell, 1982; Ohlson, 1995), where apart from 
transactions with owners, all balance sheet changes are captured in the income statement. This is known as 
‘full articulation’ and is fulfilled by comprehensive or all-inclusive income.
Despite the conceptual appeal of comprehensive income, it is not as relevant as net income to professional 
investors because they prefer earnings measures which capture recurring performance and regard transitory 
items as uninformative (Thinggaard et al., 2006; Rees and Shane, 2012).6 Prior research also suggests that 
investors sometimes prefer non-GAAP to GAAP performance measures because they are seen to be more 
closely associated with cash flows (e.g., Barton et al., 2010).
The use of financial reporting information in stewardship
Early theoretical research posited that a stewardship demand for accounting generally manifests itself in 
information with properties different from that needed for valuation decisions. Information for stewardship 
prioritises objectivity and verifiability and should be informative about the actions and effort of management, 
which are typically unobservable by investors (e.g., Gjesdal, 1981; Kothari et al., 2010). Information for 
valuation, on the other hand, is concerned with the amount, timing and uncertainty of future cash flows, 
regardless of whether or not these cash flows are attributable to managerial actions (Lambert, 2010; Beyer 
et al., 2010). 
Ijiri (1975) introduced the concept of ‘hardness’ of information. The property of hardness of a measure is 
where its construction leaves little scope for disagreement. ‘Soft’ measures, by contrast, are difficult to verify 
and can be easily ‘pushed’ in different directions. Recent theoretical research by Şabac and Tian (2015) finds 
that while soft information can be effective for stewardship (i.e., managerial performance evaluation), this 
information must be accompanied by (and correlated with) hard information. The latter can then be used to 
confirm the former. In such settings, therefore, it is typically seen as the role of more verifiable accounting 
information to provide confirmatory value and to augment the usefulness of softer, but potentially more timely 
and forward-looking sources, such as managerial forecasts (Gigler and Hemmer, 1998).
Many of the arguments in favour of a separate stewardship objective are driven by recognition of the 
differences in information between managers and investors and there is an acknowledgement that these 
differences can be exploited where preparers of information have incentives to do so (e.g., O’Connell, 2007). 
Such incentives may arise from the use of accounting data in contracts designed to control managerial actions 
and limit agency problems (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The two most common types are executive 
compensation contracts, where managers are rewarded on the basis of accounting (usually earnings) data 
(e.g., Bushman and Smith, 2001) and in debt contracts, where control of the firms’ assets can shift from 
borrowers to lenders depending on accounting ratios used in covenants (e.g., Holthausen and Watts, 2001; 
Armstrong et al., 2010).
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Accounting information is argued to be preferable to share prices in incentivising managers on the grounds 
that it is less likely to reward or penalise managers for events that are outside their control, such as macro-
economic changes (e.g., Lambert, 1993). On the other hand, linking managers’ wealth directly to accounting 
numbers that they themselves are responsible for preparing creates incentives for managers to prepare 
financial reports that influence bonuses, rather than faithfully represent the firms’ performance and/or position 
(e.g., Healy, 1985).7
Objectives and the properties of financial reporting information
While a demand for useful accounting information may arise from both stewardship and valuation decisions, 
different characteristics may be emphasised under each objective. In particular, relevance is often argued to 
be a dominant characteristic for the estimation of future cash flows, whereas representational faithfulness 
and/or reliability are argued to be more important for stewardship (e.g., Bauer et al., 2014).8
To illustrate how this may manifest itself in different financial reporting information, consider two types of 
assets: property plant and equipment (PP&E) and financial assets valued according to a ‘mark-to-model’ 
approach (e.g., level 3 fair values).
Although PP&E may be valued using a revaluation approach, preparers do not usually exercise the option 
to use fair value (e.g., Cairns et al., 2011), so it is typically measured at historical cost less accumulated 
depreciation. This often results in asset values that are based on transactions that took place several years 
before the balance sheet date (net of depreciation), making them less relevant for estimating future cash 
flows. On the other hand, such values are based on observed transaction prices, which are more easily 
verifiable by independent parties (particularly auditors).
In comparison, financial assets measured on a mark-to-model basis may produce more relevant information, 
since they are valued according to the present value of future cash flows (or some variant thereof) of the 
specific financial instrument. However, managers are responsible for determining the values of the model 
inputs, namely the estimated cash flows and discount rates, and these are ultimately unobservable. While 
managers may have the best information on these inputs, they may also have incentives to produce estimates 
which best serve their interests. The sensitivity of fair values to changes in assumptions is well-known, which 
makes them harder to verify and thus prone to errors or opportunistic managerial biases (e.g., Holthausen 
and Watts, 2001; Kothari et al., 2010; Demerjian, 2011). There is therefore a risk that managers may abuse 
the discretion involved in the valuation of such assets and liabilities and prepare information that suits their 
own interests (such as higher compensation), but is less faithfully representative. Similar criticisms have been 
aimed at accounting for goodwill impairment using a fair value approach (Ramanna and Watts, 2011). 
Under a mixed-measurement approach, therefore, the extent to which financial reporting information is 
regarded as relevant or representationally faithful potentially depends not just on whether the decision is a 
stewardship assessment or valuation, but also on which line items are being evaluated.
It is sometimes argued that stewardship implies a demand for historical cost information over current values, 
on the grounds that it is more verifiable and is based on actual, rather than predicted, data (e.g., Whittington, 
2008b). For instance, Dutta and Zhang (2002) report that mark-to-market accounting is based on anticipated, 
rather than realised, performance.9 Recent research by Anderson et al. (2015), however, challenges this 
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view using evidence from an experimental study. They find that fair value accounting can be more useful 
than historical cost because it enables investors to more accurately attribute responsibility for company 
performance to managers rather than to external events. However, the experimental setting in Anderson et 
al. (2015) constructs fair values with no inherent errors or bias, thus abstracting away from the limitations of 
fair values and does not clearly distinguish the stewardship decision from a valuation one (Emett and Nelson, 
2015). Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2015) use MBA students, rather than actual professional investors, in 
their experiment.
Much of the existing empirical evidence on the stewardship role of accounting typically involves secondary 
data to test the strength of association between firm performance measures (particularly earnings) and 
executive compensation, sometimes referred to as ‘pay-performance sensitivity’. Significant associations 
have been found, indicating that accounting information does indeed have a stewardship role in evaluating 
and incentivising managers (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993; Core et al., 2003); however, this 
finding varies across firms and such research is often subject to several technical limitations (Bushman and 
Smith, 2001). Interestingly, Ozkan et al. (2012) find that the introduction of IFRS increased the stewardship 
value of accounting (measured as pay-performance sensitivity) in Europe, though the overall effect is weak.
The importance of corporate governance
A large body of academic literature views financial reporting information as being inextricably connected to 
companies’ corporate governance structures and processes. Armstrong et al. (2010) conduct a thorough 
review of this literature and report that while the evidence is not completely conclusive, several corporate 
governance mechanisms significantly influence the quality of financial reporting information,10 including board 
structure and independence, the quality of the firm’s auditor and audit committee, ownership structure and 
the level of investor activity.
Armstrong et al. (2010) note that it is often difficult to identify the direction and nature of the relationship from 
statistical associations. Take for instance the case of auditor quality. Observed differences in the usefulness 
of accounting between firms with ‘high’ and ‘low’ quality audit (however measured) may be attributable to 
differences in capabilities or in the amount of effort expended by auditors, but may also be due to firms with 
a commitment to higher financial reporting quality choosing to spend more on audit. Similarly, while an active 
and concentrated ownership structure can reduce the manipulation of accounting data due to improved 
monitoring (Katz, 2009), other studies find a negative association between active ownership and accounting 
quality, suggesting that high quality corporate governance and high quality financial reporting are substitutes 
for one another (Bushman et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, research that examines the direction of causality finds that better governed firms tend to have 
higher quality financial reporting (García Lara et al., 2009).
Overall, what this research highlights is that it can be difficult to completely isolate financial reporting 
information from firms’ governance structures because the two are closely linked. This emphasises the need 
to properly control for governance effects in assessments of the usefulness of financial reporting information 
because a failure to do so risks attributing views about the quality of companies’ financial reporting to their 
governance.
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Summary
The existing literature demonstrates theoretically that valuation and stewardship decisions sometimes 
require the same types of information, but under some conditions, the two objectives are expected to place 
different demands on financial reporting. In particular, valuation decisions generally prioritise the relevance of 
information for estimating future cash flows, whereas stewardship tends to require more verifiable information 
that captures managerial effort. When financial accounting information is being used in contracts that 
incentivise managers, investors are expected to put more emphasis on faithful representation. Moreover, 
companies’ corporate governance arrangements are assumed to ameliorate some of the problems associated 
with managerial bias. The next chapter of the report sets out the research methods employed in this study to 
test these expectations and describes the sample of professional investors who participated in the interviews.
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RESEARCH METHODS AND SAMPLE
Introduction
To address the research questions set out in Chapter 1, a large sample of professional investors was 
interviewed. The interviews were structured around a simple case, where participants were asked to assume 
the role of one of the owners of a large European private manufacturing company. After reading the case, 
participants evaluated the usefulness of eight financial statement items (described below) as well as the 
usefulness of alternative information sources. The professional investors were given the same case study 
but were randomly assigned to one of four ‘conditions.’ These conditions were created by combining two 
different objectives of information acquisition (i.e., valuation or stewardship) and two different compensation-
based incentives.11
At the beginning of the case, half of the participants were told that their objective was to ‘assess the value of 
the firm’, (valuation objective), whilst the other half were asked to ‘assess the performance of the management 
for the current year’ (stewardship objective). The case itself contained a summary balance sheet, annual 
income statement, and an outline of relevant IFRS accounting policies, as well as key points on areas where 
management may have exercised judgement in measuring and recognising financial statements items. Exhibit 
1 provides the details of the case.12
Chapter 3
Financial information
Exhibit 1: Case study extract – Financial information




 Financial investments 634
 Plant and equipment 416
 Goodwill 443
 Other intangible assets 432
Total assets 2,450
 Trade payables 216
 Pension liabilities 435
 Long term debt 628
 Equity 1,171
Total liabilities and equity 2,450
Annual Income Statement (€ m)
Revenue 2,185
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Accounting policy information
The financial statements are prepared using IFRS. The firm uses a historical cost basis except that 
financial instruments are measured at fair value and certain other assets and liabilities are included 
on an alternative basis – most significantly, pension liabilities.
Summary of selected accounting policies
Plant and equipment and other intangible assets are measured at cost. The value of goodwill is 
tested for impairment on an annual basis. Financial investments are measured at fair value, with 
changes in fair value directly reflected in net income. Pension liabilities are the net of the present 
value of defined benefit plan obligations and external plan assets. 
Key areas of judgement and estimation uncertainty
The key areas of estimation uncertainty and of judgement required in applying the firm’s accounting 
policies are:
• The firm holds a number of minority investments in firms that are not listed on public equity 
markets. These investments are measured at fair value, requiring the use of managerial estimates. 
• The firm has significant intangible assets. Judgement is required to decide whether intangible 
assets should be recognised and in determining goodwill and intangible asset impairments.
• The accounting valuation of the pension liability is based on assumptions determined with 
independent actuarial advice and is assessed annually.
It is important to stress that all participants received the same information with respect to accounting 
numbers and policies, firm ownership and corporate governance. The case was intentionally kept simple, 
and contained no obvious ‘red flags’. This decreased the likelihood that concerns about any specific line item 
detracted attention away from the case and the main task at hand.
The participants were also informed that the company was owned by a small group of closely cooperating 
professional institutional investors that monitor the management. The case company was also audited by a 
leading audit firm and its corporate governance was of a high standard. This was described as being of similar 
quality to that required of a publicly listed firm of the same size and assessed to be of a high standard by an 
independent agency (see Exhibit 2 for details). This information was introduced to help focus participants’ 
attention on accounting issues, rather than on potential problems associated with the governance of the firm.
Exhibit 1 (cont’d): Case study extract – Financial information
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Exhibit 2: Case study extract – Auditing and corporate governance information
Auditing and corporate governance information
The firm is audited by a leading audit firm. The corporate governance is of a high standard and 
comfortably passes a quality level that would be required from a publicly-listed firm of the same size. 
In fact, the CGFA Institute, a well-reputed independent group that evaluates corporate governance 
and makes this information available to current and future investors, has rated the firm as an industry 
leader in corporate governance quality, assessing the quality of the firm corporate governance as 
seen below.
Independent assessment of the firm’s corporate governance quality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 = Lowest standard 10 = Highest standard
At the end of the case, and within the ownership and compensation structure information, the participants 
were randomly split for a second time. (Recall that they had already been split by randomly assigning them to 
two different objectives). Half of the participants were told that the firm relied on non-accounting (i.e., internal) 
data for managerial incentivisation. Specifically, this half of the sample was informed that:
[The current owners] rely on individually negotiated target plans based on internal production data for 
managerial incentivisation. This year, management will receive a generous bonus as they have exceeded 
their target production efficiency levels. 
By contrast, the other half of the sample was provided with the following information: 
[The current owners] rely on individually negotiated target plans based on financial accounting data for 
managerial incentivisation. This year, management will receive a generous bonus as they have exceeded 
their target net income levels.
Therefore, participants were split first by assigning them different information acquisition objectives and 
second, by giving them different compensation incentive schemes. This process generated four distinct 
conditions that can be visualised in Figure 1. The upper left corner (condition 1) can be characterised as a 
prototypic valuation one because investors faces a valuation objective with no contracting use of accounting 
information. Conversely, the lower right corner (condition 4) resembles a prototypical contracting condition, 
where investors face a stewardship objective and financial accounting information is being used for managerial 
compensation.
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Figure 1: The four case conditions
Notes: 
This figure explains the experimental design of the interview study. Two aspects of the assignment 
were manipulated, the information acquisition objective and the compensation-based incentives 
of the case, generating four different (2 × 2) conditions. These conditions were administered to 
participants in a between subject design, meaning that each participant receives only one condition 


















Valuation objective and 
compensation linked to non-
accounting data
Condition 3
Valuation objective and 
compensation linked to 
accounting data
Condition 2
Stewardship objective and 
compensation linked to non-
accounting data
Condition 4
Stewardship objective and 
compensation linked to 
accounting data
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To facilitate completion of the task, interviewers provided a definition of usefulness and its components. 
Usefulness was defined as comprising relevance (defined as the ability of information to influence decision 
making, assuming that it is faithfully represented), and representational faithfulness (defined as information 
that is complete, neutral and free from error). Despite providing these definitions, participants could 
conceptually link relevance and representational faithfulness to the extent that if they perceived an item 
not to be faithfully represented, they also considered it to be less relevant (Kadous et al., 2012). To address 
this issue, participants were asked to assess the usefulness of eight different items. The recognition and 
measurement of these items involve varying degrees of managerial judgement and estimation uncertainty. 
In particular, participants were asked to assess if the following items were relevant and faithfully represented 
(using a Likert scale ranging from 1=strongly agree, to 7=strongly disagree): revenue; EBITDA; net income; 
book value of property, plant and equipment; book value of financial instruments; book value of intangible 
assets (other than goodwill); book value of goodwill; and book value of pension liabilities.13 To obtain a better 
understanding of the rationale behind the answers provided, participants were asked to freely explain what 
factors were important to them when thinking about the relevance and faithful representation of financial 
accounting information. This qualitative data reveals whether the rationale for a certain answer can be traced 
to relevance-related or representational faithfulness-related considerations.
Finally, participants were asked to identify three other sources of information, in addition to financial accounting 
information, that would be useful for their assigned objective. To assess the relative importance of these 
alternative sources, they were told that they had a €100,000 budget to obtain relevant information, and to 
indicate how they would allocate the money between the sources identified, and a fourth element - improving 
the decision usefulness of available financial information. The interviews ended with a number of open-ended 
questions to conclude the case. The specific questions asked can be seen in Appendix 1.
Participants 
The interviewees were professional investors who were expert users of financial accounting information and 
had experience of both valuing firms and in assessing managerial performance. They were contacted with 
the assistance of ICAS and EFRAG. In total, 81 investors were interviewed. Of these, 72 (89%) are male and 9 
(11%) are female. Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample by age groups and geographic location. The 
sample is predominantly European and also includes interviewees in North America, thus constituting a much 
more geographically diverse snapshot of institutional investors than has been obtained in prior research. All 
participants hold at least a Bachelor’s degree, while 53 have a Master’s and 5 have a Ph.D. Out of the total 
81, 45 are characterised as accounting experts since they either have an accounting degree or professional 
accounting qualification or they state that their occupational responsibilities involve some aspect of financial 
reporting from a preparer’s perspective, as well as from a user’s. 
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Table 1: Personal demographics for full sample
Panel A: Country of work Panel B: Age group















United Kingdom 28 34.6%
United States 5 6.2%
Total 81 100.0%












This table reports key personal demographic information about the interviewees. It is based on the 
full sample of 81 interviews and responses received via the interview instrument documented in 
Appendix 1.
25
Table 2: Occupational demographics for full sample
Panel A: Nature of occupation
Panel B: Investment characteristics
Occupation No. Percentage
Fund Manager 44 54.3%
Analyst (sell-side) 22 27.2%
Analyst (buy-side) 12 14.8%
Other 3 3.7%
Total 81 100.0%
Investment characteristic No. Percentage
Asset class
Equity only 69 85.2%
Debt only 9 11.1%
Equity and debt 3 3.7%
Total 81 100.0%
Listing type
Public firms only 58 71.6%
Public and private firms 17 21.0%










North America 6 7.4%
Asia 2 2.5%
Total 81 100.0%
Details of participants’ occupation are reported in Table 2. The majority (44 participants - 54%) characterise 
themselves as fund managers. Meanwhile, 34 are classified as analysts, of which 22 are sell-side. This implies 
that most participants (56 participants or 69%) have a buy-side focus. This can be regarded as a strength of the 
sample, since the research questions concern the information acquisition behaviour of professional investors 
and it is important that participants recognise the nature of both valuation and stewardship decisions. With 
respect to the asset, industry and geographic focus of our participants (Panel B of Table 2), most participants 
have a clear focus on equity instruments issued by publicly-listed firms. While a sizable portion of the sample 
has a stated geographic or industry focus, many participants have no such specialisation.
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Table 2 (cont’d): Occupational demographics for full sample
Panel C: Investment experience
Panel D: Characteristics of managed funds
Variable No. Mean SD
No. of stocks monitored per year 77 61.1 70.0
Years of experience overall 81 20.1 8.6
Years of experience in current position 78 8.9 7.6
Variable No. Mean SD
Value of funds under management (US-$m) 38 1562.4 2864.6
No. of stocks held 38 82.3 138.4
Average holding period in years 38 3.7 4.7
Notes: 
This table reports information about the investment background of the interviewees. It is based on 
the full sample of 81 interviews and responses received via the interview instrument documented 
in Appendix 1. Panels C and D present distributional properties of sample variables. Mean is the 
average value. SD is the standard deviation of the value. When SD is large, it indicates a large 
dispersion around the average value. When SD is small, it indicates a large concentration around 
the average value. 
Panel C reports the investment experience of participants. They have an average of 20 years experience 
as professional investors in total, and about nine years in their current position. They regularly monitor an 
average of about 60 firms for their investment decisions. Three participants’ occupations are classified as 
‘other’ in Panel A. These participants are either retired, or they are currently employed in a position that cannot 
be unambiguously classified as a fund manager or as an analyst. All have significant prior experience as an 
institutional investor and deleting them from the sample has no material effect on the findings reported below.
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For the sub-group of fund managers, basic statistics about individual funds under management are reported 
in Panel D of Table 2 (38 of the 44 fund managers provided this information). The mean (median) value of funds 
under individual management is roughly US$1.6 billion (US$400 million). These interviewees hold an average 
number of 82 different stocks and their average holding period is approximately 3.7 years. This indicates that 
the fund managers in the sample represent influential and sizable institutional investors. Asked to evaluate 
the size of their firm relative to its competitors, participants rank their institution from very large to very small, 
with most classifying their company as very large (23).
The subsequent analyses use the maximum sample of participants available for each test. All 81 interviews 
are used in the qualitative analyses as they contain valuable information on the rationales that underpin the 
quantitative findings. Out of the 81 interviewees, 76 provided complete answers to the quantitative survey. 
The descriptive evidence on the decision usefulness of different financial accounting items is based on this 
sample. Finally, for the quantitative analyses of the effects of objectives, only participants that provided full 
answers to the final quantitative instrument and passed the manipulation checks (i.e., two test questions 
which were included to check participants understood the facts of the case) were included. Five participants 
were excluded due to a different experimental design used at the pilot stage. Overall, 85% of participants 
passed both test questions on the case, indicating that the vast majority of participants fully understood 
their objective and the accounting and corporate governance characteristics of the company case, but 11 
participants were discarded because they failed to pass the two test questions. This reduces the sample size 
from 76 to 60. An analysis of the various sub-samples revealed no significant demographic differences.
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This chapter presents the results of the study. The main findings are presented according to the research 
questions, combining both quantitative and qualitative analyses. After presenting descriptive evidence on the 
usefulness of financial reporting, the results on the effects of objectives and accounting-based compensation 
arrangements on professional investors’ assessments of the decision usefulness of financial reporting 
information overall are reported, before an analysis of separate line items in the income statement and the 
balance sheet. This is followed by an analysis of the usefulness of financial reporting relative to other information 
sources and how this is affected by the different conditions in the case. Finally, the chapter presents the results 
of the influence of companies’ corporate governance mechanisms on professional investors’ assessments of 
the decision usefulness of financial reporting information.
The overall usefulness of financial reporting
Before examining differences between professional investors, it is informative to assess their views of the 
usefulness of financial reporting information overall. Table 3 shows that professional investors consider 
financial reporting data to be both relevant and faithfully represented overall, with an average rating of 
approximately five on the seven point scale, (where seven indicates strong agreement with the statement 
that the information is relevant/faithfully represented). Overall, the evidence reported in Table 3 suggests that 
financial information is assessed to be more relevant (average assessment of 5.05), than faithfully represented 
(average assessment of 4.69).
Table 3: Decision usefulness of financial reporting information
Mean SD
Average assessed relevance overall 5.05 1.05
Average assessed representational faithfulness overall 4.69 1.01
Notes: 
This table is based on a sample of 76 interviews. It presents the numerical value obtained from 
averaging the responses provided to the question ‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following 
financial accounting information items to be relevant / faithfully represented’ across the eight items 
considered: revenue, EBITDA, net income, property plant & equipment, financial investments, 
intangible assets (other than goodwill), goodwill, and pension liabilities. The scale reported here 
ranks from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). In the table, Mean is the average value. SD is the standard 
deviation of the value. When SD is large, it indicates a large dispersion around the average value. 
When SD is small, it indicates a large concentration around the average value.
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The qualitative interview data also support the idea that financial reporting data are highly useful overall, as the 
following quotes illustrate:
I would say, of [the other information sources used], the single most important is these financial 
accounts. (Fund manager, UK) 
I think, [financial reporting information] is absolutely critical because ... to my mind the financial 
statements are the basis on which so much else falls. (Fund manager, UK)
And it gives us now insight as to what is happening in the future, or indeed, if trends are to be believed, 
what has happened in the past. And the story is the history and the future. (Fund manager, UK)
Effects of objectives and accounting-based compensation incentives
Figure 2 reports expectations and findings for the effects of objectives and accounting-based compensation on 
the assessed usefulness of financial reporting information. In line with the theoretical literature outlined earlier, 
investors are expected to assess financial reporting information to be more relevant when their objective is to 
value the firm. Also, the use of financial accounting in compensation is predicted to create concerns about its 
representational faithfulness, particularly with respect to its neutrality. No clear predictions are made for the 
effect of objectives on representational faithfulness or for the effect of accounting-based compensation on 
assessed relevance of financial reporting data. 
As Figure 2 shows, the findings provide support for the prediction that objectives matter. More specifically, 
investors consider financial reporting information as more relevant for valuation decisions than for stewardship 
decisions. However, while the valuation objective affects the assessed relevance of financial reporting 
information, there is no clear effect of accounting-based compensation arrangements on professional investors’ 
assessments of representational faithfulness. 
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Figure 2: Effects of objectives and compensation arrangements
Notes: 
This figure reports the expected effects of our two experimental manipulations (information 
acquisition objective and managerial compensation base) on the assessed decision usefulness of 
financial accounting information (left column) as well as the empirical mean effects for a sample of 
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Table 4 presents a comparison of the average effects of investors’ objective and the use of accounting in 
compensation contracts on their assessments of financial reporting information overall.
Table 4: Effects of objective and compensation arrangements
Mean SD
Valuation objective/compensation based on non-accounting data (n=15)
Average assessed relevance overall 5.52 0.88
Average assessed representational faithfulness overall 4.46 1.10
Valuation objective/compensation based on financial accounting data (n=15)
Average assessed relevance overall 5.24 0.76
Average assessed representational faithfulness overall 4.94 0.92
Stewardship objective/compensation based on non-accounting data (n=11)
Average assessed relevance overall 5.10 1.15
Average assessed representational faithfulness overall 5.14 1.15
Stewardship objective/compensation based on financial accounting data (n=19)
Average assessed relevance overall 5.01 1.16
Average assessed representational faithfulness overall 4.80 0.92
Notes: 
This table is based on the sample of 60 interviews. It presents, for each condition, the numerical 
value obtained from averaging the responses provided to the question ‘For my objective in the case, 
I assess the following financial accounting information items to be relevant / faithfully represented’ 
across the eight items considered: revenue, EBITDA, net income, property plant & equipment, 
financial investments, intangible assets (other than goodwill), goodwill, and pension liabilities. The 
scale reported here ranks from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). In the table, Mean is the average value. 
SD is the standard deviation of the value. When SD is large, it indicates a large dispersion around 
the average value. When SD is small, it indicates a large concentration around the average value. 
Conditions are presented in Figure 1. Sample participants are split twice. First, half of them are 
asked to use the case to value the firm (valuation objective), half of them are asked to use the case 
to assess the performance of management (stewardship objective). Second, half of them are told 
that managerial compensation is based on financial accounting data, and half of them are told that 
managerial compensation is based on non-financial accounting data.
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While the differences between the means in Table 4 are not statistically significant at conventional levels, the 
average difference in relevance caused by the valuation objective is close to significant for overall relevance. 
Despite being large for an interview study, the sample size is still comparatively small, however, and this is likely 
to contribute to low statistical power.
Overall, participants with the objective of valuing the firm tend to consider financial accounting information to 
be more relevant than those charged with assessing the performance of the management. The results indicate 
a statistically weak but economically substantial effect of the objective of financial reporting information on its 
assessed relevance. To understand the economic effect, consider the following. Comparing the assessments 
made by participants presented with a valuation objective (overall relevance of 5.52 and 5.24 in Table 4), with 
the assessments made by those presented with the stewardship objective (overall relevance of 5.10 and 
5.01), reveals an average difference of 0.34 points, which means a decrease of 7% in the assessed relevance 
of financial information for the stewardship objective compared to the valuation objective.
This question is also addressed using a multivariate analysis, which controls for various other characteristics 
of the participants (and the interviewer) that might lead to systematic differences in responses.14 Specifically, 
the multivariate analysis controls for participants’ experience, accounting expertise, gender, age, occupation 
and whether or not they specialise in the financial services industry.
The results from the multivariate analysis (not reported in the report but available from the authors on 
request) are consistent with the univariate results reported above and show that the valuation objective 
has a strong positive effect on the assessed relevance of financial accounting information. These results 
imply that professional investors assess financial accounting information in general to be more relevant for 
assessing company value than for the stewardship objective of assessing the performance of managers. 
The multivariate analysis reveals no robust evidence for the effect of the use of accounting information in 
management compensation on the assessed representational faithfulness of financial reporting information. 
Based on this, investors do not regard earnings management incentives triggered by the use of financial 
accounting information in managerial compensation to be so substantial that they impair the representational 
faithfulness of financial reporting information. However, this analysis does not take account of corporate 
governance mechanisms that may influence representational faithfulness more than relevance. This issue is 
explored in more detail in a separate section below on ‘Corporate governance and the assessed usefulness 
of financial information’.
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Key points:
• Financial reporting information is regarded as highly useful to professional investors overall.
• Objectives do matter: professional investors’ assessments of the usefulness of financial 
reporting information are affected by whether they are using the information for valuation or for 
stewardship.
• When given a valuation objective, investors assess financial accounting information to be more 
relevant than when they have a stewardship objective.
• Tying financial reporting information to managerial compensation has no significant effect on 
professional investors’ assessments of representational faithfulness.
Professional investors and the usefulness of the income statement and statement of financial 
position
The results in the previous section demonstrate that professional investors’ assessments of the usefulness of 
financial reporting information overall are affected by their decision objective. The present mixed measurement 
financial reporting model produces line items with different properties, and the suitability of these line items may 
therefore vary for valuation and stewardship decisions. Moreover, the conceptual primacy given to the balance 
sheet by standard setters is not in accordance with prior research indicating investor preferences for the income 
statement. This section presents the results on assessed usefulness separated by financial statement and by 
line item.
Figure 3 shows the average scores for both relevance and representational faithfulness for the participants who 
provided answers to questions for all the balance sheet and income statement line items (76 participants).15 As 
can be seen by the graph, participants generally rank income statement line items as more relevant and faithfully 
represented than balance sheet line items. Statistical tests showed these differences to be significant at the 0.01 
level.16 Also, income statement line items are assessed as significantly more relevant than faithfully represented 
(significant at the 0.01 level), while this is not generally the case for balance sheet line items (no significant 
difference). Looking at the individual balance sheet line items, it is clear that participants differentiate between 
different line items. While property plant and equipment is assessed to be more representationally faithful than 
relevant (significant at the 0.01 level), the opposite is true for financial instruments. Intangible assets (other than 
goodwill), goodwill and pension liabilities are also assessed to be more relevant than representationally faithful, 
but these differences are not significant at conventional levels.17
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Figure 3: Assessed decision usefulness of financial accounting information
Notes: 
This graph reports the assessed decision usefulness of financial accounting information for a 
sample of 76 institutional investors with complete data. It is based on the level of agreement with the 
statement ‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items 
to be relevant/faithfully represented.’ The scale reported here ranks from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree), so that higher values indicate higher levels of assessed relevance/representational 
faithfulness. The error indicators show the 95% confidence intervals of the respective means.
Abbreviations: PPE = Property, plant and equipment; FI = Financial instruments; Int. assets = 
Intangible assets (excluding goodwill).
revenue EBITDA PPE
relevance faithful representation
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When the effects of objectives and accounting compensation arrangements on the different financial 
statements and line items are examined, the valuation objective has a robust positive effect on the assessed 
relevance of financial accounting information and the effects are larger for balance sheet line items. The 
overall effects are presented in Figure 4, while the effects on individual line items are shown in Figure 5.18
Figure 4: Assessed relevance by information acquisition objective and financial statement type










This graph reports the assessed relevance of financial accounting information for a sample of 76 
institutional investors with complete data. It is based on the level of agreement with the statement 
‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items to be 
relevant’, where the objective is either one of valuing the company (valuation) or assessing the 
performance of management (stewardship). The scale reported here ranks from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree), so that higher values indicate higher levels of assessed relevance. Calculations 
are based on the average for all income statement and balance sheet items.
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Notes: 
This graph reports the assessed relevance of financial accounting information for a sample of 76 
institutional investors with complete data. It is based on the level of agreement with the statement 
‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items to be 
relevant’, where the objective is either one of valuing the company (valuation) or assessing the 
performance of management (stewardship). The scale reported here ranks from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree), so that higher values indicate higher levels of assessed relevance. 
Abbreviations: PPE = Property, plant and equipment; FI = Financial instruments; Int. assets = 
Intangible assets (excluding goodwill).
Figure 5: Assessed relevance by information acquisition objective and line item
revenue EBITDA PPE
valuation stewardship
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As expected, differences are particularly pronounced when the link between managerial effort and financial 
accounting outcome can be assumed to be low, as with financial instruments, goodwill, intangible assets and 
pension liabilities. These results confirm expectations about the effect of professional investors’ objective on the 
assessed relevance of financial accounting information. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that professional investors generally evaluate information from the income 
statement to be more decision useful for their assigned objective than balance sheet information. Moreover, the 
effects are larger for balance sheet line items.
Additional multivariate results (not reported here but available from the authors on request) suggest that the 
use of financial accounting information in managerial compensation contracts has a negative impact on the 
assessed representational usefulness of financial accounting information, but the effects are not statistically 
significant. In summary, the results indicate that the effect of the valuation objective is significant, whereas the 
use of accounting in compensation has no discernible effect. This latter result is explored further below.
Although these quantitative results are useful for assessing the magnitude of differences in assessed usefulness 
of different line items, they are uninformative about the reasons for such differences. Table 5 (Panels A and B) 
presents the qualitative results for the rationales given by participants to explain the assessed usefulness of 
each of the individual line items, as well as the financial statements overall.
Panel A summarises the rationales associated with ‘relevance’ and Panel B with ‘representational faithfulness’. 
In both panels, the numbers reported indicate net tone (positive, negative or neutral). When the net perception 
is positive, green is used to colour the cell and when it is negative, red is used.19 Overall, participants appear 
to be more willing to discuss in detail the rationales underpinning high scores than low scores for relevance, 
whereas the opposite is the case for representational faithfulness.
Table 5 suggests that line items are assessed as relevant when they help investors predict future outcomes, 
in particular, to predict cash flows and risk (i.e., they have a ‘predictive role’ or ‘predictive role (risk)’), and 
also, when they help financial statement users understand the business of the firm (they provide ‘business 
understanding’). Slightly less often, users perceive that items are relevant if they provide feedback about 
previous evaluations (‘confirmatory role’). Finally, line items are regarded as relevant if they are useful to 
assess the performance of managers (‘managerial performance’). Panel A contains a final category: ‘relevance 
(general)’, which is used when it is not possible to clearly identify any of the aforementioned individual 
rationales.
38
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Professional investors and the decision usefulness of financial reporting - EFRAG - ICAS Report
Professional investors’ views of relevance of line items
Panel A reveals that revenue and EBITDA are considered the most relevant items. This is because they help 
users understand the business of the firm and assist in predicting future cash flows, respectively. It is interesting 
to note that EBITDA receives the highest positive score overall. This represents an interesting finding for at 
least two reasons. First, EBITDA is a non-GAAP measure with considerable managerial discretion over how it 
is calculated. Second, participants often criticised how EBITDA was constructed. This is because in the case, 
EBITDA incorporated investment income, which the participants regarded as problematic, due to concerns 
about the uncertainty over the income generation from subsidiaries, control over minority interests, earnings 
generated from financial investments in the past year, and fair value measurement. The following quotes are 
illustrative:
So, in my mind, the key numbers in terms of relevance would always be the items that underpin cash flows 
or the core business model cash flows that are represented it in the P&L account. And that is why I say, 
revenue is highly relevant. (Buy-side analyst, UK)
I consider the profitability to be of the greatest relevance. I am looking primarily at EBITDA, EBIT, EBIT 
margins. I typically adjust for the goodwill impairment as it is of more discretionary nature. (Fund manager, 
Sweden)
The reason we use EBITDA is because it is more of a proxy for the cash generation of the business. The 
sustainable cash generation. Because the only thing you are deducting from EBITDA to get to net profit is 
the depreciation, which is a non-cash-item, and amortisation, which is a non-cash-item, so ... you know, 
you could argue, well actually you should look at the cash-flow generation of the business over a period 
of time to assess its value, but the way the industry is developed, you typically look at the P&L of the 
business and specifically EBITDA. (Fund manager, UK)
While these findings are similar to the quantitative results presented in Figure 3, the reverse ordering of revenue 
and EBITDA is noteworthy. This may, to some extent, be driven by the quantitative relevance rank of EBITDA 
also reflecting some concerns with respect to faithful representation.
Net income is generally considered of low relevance in the qualitative data (negative score of -5). This finding 
is mainly driven by the low perceived usefulness for the stewardship objective (i.e., for assessing managerial 
performance), although the participants also noted concerns about net income incorporating items that are non-
recurring in nature and not related to the core business. This is illustrated by the following quotes:
Net income ... less important I would say, because there are taxes, one-offs ... yes. And also ... yes, 
financial income, that ... have ... might have less to do with the business model and so on, so I would put 
it then in the middle. (Buy-side analyst, Germany)
Well, the difference between EBITDA and net income is things that you cannot really ... Well, you can 
control it, but the non-cash items being depreciation and goodwill, so, they are a function of your capex 
policy and your balance sheet that you have ... where you are at. And your interest is a function of your 
balance sheet structure. As an equity shareholder, I have made a conscious decision presumably to have 
a certain level of equity and a certain level of borrowing. So if it is generating cash, paying down its debt, 
it is doing what it should be. So I am more ... the way I look at companies, I am more interested in the 
trading performance than the net income performance. (Fund manager, UK)
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Regarding the balance sheet, only financial instruments score positively on relevance. A UK fund manager 
explained why this was the case:
Yes, I mean, financial instruments for this firm are clearly quite important because it is telling you about 
the success of their investments in their minorities. So, that would be the reason why. (Fund manager, UK)
There were some reservations expressed about the relevance of this information for stewardship assessments, 
however:
… because they have got minority interest in companies that have no influence or control over ... they are 
what they are, so they are not ... the management do not really ... cannot be judged on their performance 
and cannot control it. (Fund manager, UK)
Property, plant and equipment (PP&E), intangibles, goodwill, and pension liabilities all have negative net values. 
PP&E is clearly regarded as the least relevant line item in terms of its predictive ability. The following quotes 
exemplify some of the reasons behind these results and also show that whether managers are responsible for a 
particular line item is important in assessing its relevance:
Well, book value for plant and equipment measured at cost for me doesn’t matter, because what I am 
trying to calculate is the real value of the firm based on future cash flows. (Sell-side analyst, Spain) 
Not very relevant, because ... generally those intangible assets from memory ... tend to be internally 
generated assets. And it’s very hard to assess the veracity of what management is telling you. So I just 
discount it really, I just ignore it, to be honest. (Fund manager, UK)
... how important, how relevant is [intangible assets] for the value of the company? On a cash basis, I 
do not think it is relevant at all. (Fund manager, US)
[Goodwill is] ... irrelevant to me ... again, because ... the managers may not necessarily be responsible 
for making those acquisitions. They may be done by the owners who have collected these things, and 
largely at some cost. (Fund manager, Canada)
... I put that [pension liabilities] as a six again, because it’s outside the control ... largely outside the 
control of the management team. And if our goal is to assess their performance ... changes in income 
or interest rates et cetera is not something that they could be responsible for. (Fund manager, Canada)
Probably I’d say a five ... on the basis of ... you know, pension liabilities are often outside a management 
team’s control. It’s more a board level control or a wider issue. (Fund manager, UK)
In the case of intangible assets, even when asked about the relevance of information, participants often cited 
concerns about faithful representation, as the following quote illustrates:
Another point is, these intangible assets, what is this, why is this and how it is valued? So, if something 
is not priced or is illiquid, how is the price? So, you have this bookkeeping process to give them a price 
... I don’t trust this. (Buy-side analyst, Germany)
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In some circumstances, however, particularly for financial companies and where companies were considered 
more risky, the balance sheet was assessed to be more relevant, as indicated by the following quote:
…. a lot of people don’t actually place that much emphasis on these types of numbers, balance sheet 
numbers, because they are so concerned about profit margins, EBITDA margins, is top line growth still 
there, and that is the focus. And then you will look at the cash flow numbers ... [It] is only at extreme 
times of stress in the market where the balance sheets become important. … And the balance sheet 
actually for a lot of people [is the] third thing they would look at. (Fund manager, UK)
Overall, therefore, the qualitative evidence suggests that balance sheet line items are perceived as less 
relevant than income statement items, particularly in terms of predicting future cash flows. This evidence is in 
line with the quantitative findings reported above. A more detailed look at the quotes reveals that participants 
positively view financial instruments and goodwill as items that help users in predicting risk and that serve 
a confirmatory role. Participants also commented positively on goodwill and PP&E as containing historical 
information that is helpful when trying to understand the companies’ growth history and return on capital 
employed.
There was, however, widespread acknowledgement of the lack of cash flow statement data by participants, 
as indicated below:
In general, I think what I call the ‘Holy Trinity’: the income statement, balance sheet and the cash flow 
statement. I mean, that is a minimum that you need to make a serious assessment of the value of a 
company. Here you are obviously missing out on the cash flow side. (Fund manager, Sweden)
Professional investors’ views of representational faithfulness of line items
According to the guidance given to participants in the case, line items are faithfully represented if they are 
complete, neutral and free from error. The concerns expressed over faithful representation in Panel B of Table 
5 are classified as follows.
Financial statements line items may contain errors. These errors may be caused because the underlying 
economic phenomena are inherently complex and/or difficult to estimate (denoted as ‘error (complexity)’). 
Participants also cite managerial subjectivity and discretion in accounting rules as a potential source of 
errors (‘error (subjectivity)’). Errors are different from biases. Biased items are not expected to be neutral, 
because they are systematically manipulated, slanted or weighted. Biases are coded into two categories: 
those introduced by accounting rules (‘bias (accounting rules)’), and those introduced by management when, 
for example, they engage in earnings management, or optimism in making estimates (‘bias (management)’). 
Quotes are also coded under ‘completeness’, where participants specifically mention that an item does 
not include all information, descriptions and explanations necessary to understand the phenomenon being 
depicted. As in Panel A, a final category is also created (‘faithful representation (general)’) for the cases where 
a single rationale for representational faithfulness cannot be readily identified.
With the exception of PP&E, participants expressed significant concerns about the representational 
faithfulness of all items. Participants requested additional information on revenue and expressed doubts over 
whether firms correctly apply revenue recognition criteria, in particular, with regards to timing issues. As the 
following quotes indicate, participants were concerned about subjectivity and manipulation when discussing 
revenue, EBITDA and particularly, net income.
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It is difficult actually, because revenue recognition, that is an art, as you know. (Fund manager, Sweden)
So it’s really an opinion. EBITDA is an opinion, based on very subjective judgements to adjust that 
number. (Sell-side analyst, US)
[EBITDA] is a very untrustworthy figure. But it’s very commonly used ... And ... there is no strict definition 
of the figure either. So there are different ways of defining it and deriving it. (Sell-side analyst, UK)
It is just the further you get down the list, the more error ... It is a bit like when you take a blank sheet 
of paper and put it in a copy machine and press copy, when you take that paper and put it in the copy 
machine and press copy, by the fifth generation it has amplified any errors that might have occurred, 
whereas the first sheet of paper was clean. So, you are starting with the revenue recognition policies, 
going through what gets you to EBITDA. But by the time you get to net income, you then have flowed 
through all of these things such as, you know, you are testing for goodwill and then impairing, changes 
in fair value for financial investments going to net income. So, by the time you get to net income, it is a 
less pure number. (Fund manager, Germany)
Regarding the balance sheet line items, participants were less concerned about the measurement of PP&E, 
but were critical of the existing accounting criteria for the recognition and measurement of intangible assets 
and goodwill. In the case of goodwill, these concerns often extended to the assessed representational 
faithfulness of net income, as many of the participants mentioned the calculation of goodwill impairments 
as a particularly problematic area. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 5, financial instruments receive the 
most negative assessment of faithful representation. The financial instruments in the case were described 
as minority investments in private firms, measured at fair value and thus requiring the use of managerial 
estimates. This created concerns over subjectivity and potential managerial manipulation when calculating 
fair value level 3 estimates. The following quotes illustrate these findings:
[When asked about representational faithfulness of PPE] Yes, I like that. Especially if things are based 
on cost, I like that. (Fund manager, Canada)
[When asked about representational faithfulness of financial instruments] That is one ... I could disagree 
more with this one, as it is marked to model. There are too many assumptions. Could it be worth 634, 
could it be worth 834 or 434? I bet any accountant can justify any of those answers. (Buy-side analyst, 
Switzerland)
Today, the fact of keeping [goodwill] in the balance sheet, unamortised, because that’s the current 
policy, makes no economic sense to me. Carrying out a test is absolutely no guarantee that goodwill 
isn’t impaired at a point in time, since it’s the person who bought it who’s doing the test. So that’s bound 
to lead us into Snow White accounting. (Sell-side analyst, France)
In the case of pension liabilities, while there was some concern about potential bias, many concerns revolved 
around the judgements involved, as the following quotes illustrate:
Yes, that is also very complex to model. I would say …, because we have so many assumptions ... [I 
strongly disagree that it is faithfully represented], because many companies are not very prudent on that 
one because... especially at the moment because of the low interest rates or decreasing interest rates. 
They try to not be forced to put more money on the table. So, I would say that is a very difficult one to 
get. (Fund manager, Germany)
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Well, again [I strongly disagree it is faithfully represented] because … I don’t have any faith that that is 
really what the present value of their pension liabilities actually is. I think it is because, you know, the 
corporate bond rate at the moment might not reflect what it will be over the next ... over the life of the 
pension scheme. And there are so many moving parts in that ... the pension liability. I mean, you need to 
have a number, but I don’t have a great deal of faith that the actual result is right. (Sell-side analyst, UK)
Overall, the evidence provided in Table 5 reinforces the findings from the quantitative analysis and also offers 
some interesting insights into the reasons behind professional investors’ assessments of the usefulness of 
financial reporting information.
Key points:
• Regardless of their objective, professional investors assess information in the income statement 
to be significantly more useful than information in the balance sheet.
• Revenue and EBITDA are assessed to be more relevant and more faithfully represented than net 
income.
• Revenue is assessed to be important for understanding the business, as well as for calculating 
and estimating growth and profit margins.
• Professional investors often rely on non-GAAP performance measures because they regard 
such measures are more informative about managerial performance and operating activities 
than net income.
• Concerns about line items in the balance sheet are often due to perceptions of subjectivity and 
managerial bias.
• Level three financial instruments and intangible assets are assessed to be more relevant and 
less faithfully represented than property, plant and equipment.
• The balance sheet is considered by some professional investors to be more relevant for financial 
companies and where company risk is high.
Alternative information sources
Besides assessing and discussing the decision usefulness of financial statement line items, participants 
were also asked to name three additional information sources that they would be using for their assigned 
information objective and to allocate a fictional budget amongst financial accounting information and these 
three additional information sources. Table 6 reports the weighted shares of the different information sources, 
while Figure 6 reports these results graphically. Participants were advised to bear in mind that the share for 
financial accounting had been prompted, while the other information sources were provided spontaneously. 
Nevertheless, participants stressed the paramount importance of financial reporting information for their 
objective.
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Table 6: Requested additional information by content
Weighted %
Financial accounting information 34.8%
Qualitative data on business 13.7%
Non-financial quantitative data on business 13.4%
Data on competitors and industry 12.3%
Data on products and markets 8.1%
Information about corporate governance 3.9%





This table is based on the full sample of 81 interviews and classifies the additional information 
sources by content. Each information source is weighted by its individual budget share as specified 
by the interviewee. The weighted share of financial accounting information is added for the ease of 
comparison but should be interpreted with a degree of caution because it was prompted, whereas 
the other information sources were collected via an open-form question. 
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Figure 6: Effects of investors’ information acquisition objective on the usage of 
alternative information sources
Notes: 
This graph reports the assessed importance of financial accounting information and alternative 
information sources. It is based on responses provided by participants to the question ‘Besides 
financial accounting information, what kind of additional information would you like to obtain for 
your assigned case perspective? Please name the three most important sources.’ The percentages 
reported indicate the relative importance given to these three identified alternative sources and to 
financial information, and are obtained by averaging the responses given by participants when asked 
to allocate a budget of 100,000 EUR to obtain information on the three items identified as a well as 
to ‘improve the decision usefulness of available financial accounting information.’ The percentages 
therefore indicate the average budget assigned to each information source, by objective. 
valuation
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As can be seen in Table 6, participants allocated about 35% of their hypothetical budget on gathering and 
analysing financial accounting information, whereas the other information sources represented clusters of 
divergent information interests. While qualitative data on the firm (13.7%) and non-financial quantitative data 
about the firm (13.4%) can be considered to be direct complements or substitutes for financial accounting 
information, the other relevant information sources complement the firm-specific information that is being 
provided by the financial reporting system. Typically, the sources of information that are mentioned originate 
from both management of the respective firm and ‘in-house’, as well as external information intermediaries, 
such as financial analysts and rating agencies.
Taken together, qualitative and quantitative non-financial company-specific information produce a share that 
is roughly comparable with the magnitude of the share of financial accounting per se. This provides evidence 
that financial accounting provides about half of the company-specific information that professional investors 
claim to use when faced with typical investment-related decisions. 
One might expect that the share awarded to financial reporting information would be higher for company 
valuation, given that participants view it to be more relevant when faced with this objective. On the other 
hand, the amount of budget allocated to a single information source depends not only on its quality, but also 
on the quality and availability of alternative information sources. While the quality of alternative information 
sources is not assessed directly in the research design, it is likely that participants have different views 
about the alternative information sources depending on their objective. It may be that alternative information 
sources are more readily available and of higher quality for the valuation rather than the stewardship objective. 
This may cause participants to assign a larger weight to financial accounting information when assessing the 
performance of management.
A multivariate analysis was conducted to explore whether the effect of the stewardship or valuation objective 
also affects the relative importance of financial accounting information compared with alternative information 
sources. This is measured as the relative share (out of 100% compared with their three top other non-
accounting sources) that participants allocate to financial accounting information. The results of this analysis 
(not reported here but available from the authors on request) indicates that professional investors attach a 
larger weight to financial reporting information when their assigned objective is to assess the performance 
of management. This finding is consistent with expectations outlined above and indicates that, although 
they generally assess financial accounting information to be less suitable for assessing the performance 
of management, professional investors still rely on it more than other sources. This hints at a potential 
competitive advantage of financial accounting information in stewardship settings, even though it is not 
assessed to be optimal for this objective. There was also some evidence in the multivariate analysis that 
investors use financial accounting information relatively less when managerial compensation is linked to 
financial accounting data.
Because of the need to keep the interviews to a reasonable length of time, the case study lacked additional 
information that would normally be accessible to professional investors when studying financial reports. The 
qualitative data were therefore analysed in order to assess the usefulness of such additional information. The 
results are presented in Table 7: Panel A reports discussions of relevance of different items, while Panel B 
presents results on representational faithfulness.20 The table presents, using a grey colouring scheme, how 
often certain elements were discussed as a means to improve the decision usefulness of financial information. 
The numbers in the cells indicate the number of times each item was mentioned.
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Table 7: Additional information discussed as a means to improve decision usefulness
Panel A: Relevance (Darker: higher frequency count)






Predictive role 2 1 1 1
Predictive role (risk) 1 1
Business understanding 1 1 1
Confirmatory role 1
Managerial performance 1 2
Relevance (general) 4 3 1
Total relevance 7 3 6 6
Panel B: Representational faithfulness (Darker: higher frequency count)









Bias (management) 1 1 2
Completeness 8 1 12 3
Faithful representation 1 2
Total faithful representation 9 2 18 5
Notes: 
This table is based on 76 coded interviews and presents descriptive evidence on the frequency 
of different topic discussed across the different themes pertaining to the relevance (Panel A) and 
representational faithfulness (Panel B) properties of financial accounting information. The coding 
process is described in the text. The score presented in both Panel A and B are frequency counts 
and capture the number of times a specific topic is mentioned as a potential remedy whenever a 
certain theme is discussed. Cells are highlighted in different shades of grey. Darker cells portray 
higher frequency counts.
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The evidence reported in Table 7 Panel A reveals that the cash flow statement, segment reporting, the notes 
to the financial statements and voluntary disclosures are often cited by participants as having the ability to 
reinforce the relevance of financial statements. In Panel B, the footnotes to the financial statements (notes) 
are shown as being highly important in improving the extent to which the information provided is perceived 
to be complete. While professional investors noted the ever-increasing length and complexity of firm financial 
statements, this was generally not viewed as problematic. The following quotes may exemplify this concern 
as well as the general positive view of the information contained in the notes and additional disclosures: 
IAS are really super complex, you can find tons of information in the notes, there is a risk of information 
overload. (Buy-side analyst, Switzerland)
Actually I am not concerned about the length. Actually I ... because I want to get as much information 
as possible, and I actually do have time to go through it. So, I am not that concerned about the notes 
or the length or the disclosure. No, but I know that this is a huge issue. And if I were a little investor, I 
would say that the annual reports when we are reporting according IFRS are very complex. (Sell-side 
analyst, Denmark) 
Overall, these results complement those above where professional investors expressed concerns around 
the representational faithfulness of balance sheet items such as financial instruments, intangible assets and 
pension liabilities. The notes facilitate more informed judgements on the valuation of these items, particularly 
given the disclosures surrounding the inputs used in the valuation of such items.
Key points:
• Financial reporting is considered to be the most valuable information source by professional 
investors.
• Non-financial information and data on the company’s business, markets and industry are also 
highly important sources.
• Professional investors’ information objective significantly affects how financial reporting 
information is used.
• Significantly more weight is attached to accounting information for stewardship purposes 
compared with company valuation.
• Additional disclosures such as notes, segments, and cash flow data are important in enhancing 
the decision usefulness of information in the income statement and balance sheet.
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Corporate governance and the assessed usefulness of financial information
A key question addressed in the study is the extent to which professional investors’ assessments of corporate 
governance quality influence their judgements of the usefulness of financial reporting information. Corporate 
governance constitutes the architecture of accountability, by providing the structures and processes that 
ensure firms are managed in the interests of their owners. Despite this, as noted in the Higgs (2003) report, 
architecture in itself does not deliver good outcomes, nor does accounting in itself. An ever-growing literature 
in accounting identifies important linkages between several corporate governance mechanisms and the 
quality of financial reporting information. Such mechanisms include board structure and independence, 
the quality of the firm’s auditor and audit committee, ownership structure and the level of investor activity. 
However, as noted above, this evidence is often problematic, because identifying the direction and nature 
of the relationship from statistical associations is difficult (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010). In particular, it is very 
difficult to completely isolate financial reporting information from corporate governance structures because 
the two are closely linked. Hence, financial reporting does not exist in a vacuum; instead, it is interlinked 
with a number of other firm mechanisms that are also likely to be assessed by professional investors when 
considering reported numbers.
Given this, it is important to understand the role of corporate governance in explaining the assessed relevance 
and representational faithfulness of financial accounting information. As discussed in the methodology chapter, 
the general corporate governance characteristics of the case company were the same across all interviewees 
(See Exhibits 1 and 2 for details). In particular, the case company was audited by a large audit firm, its 
corporate governance was assessed as being of high quality by an independent body and the owners were a 
group of closely cooperating institutional investors. Given that all participants received the same information, 
there is no scope for estimating causal effects of corporate governance on the decision usefulness of financial 
accounting information. Nevertheless, it is possible to explore whether the governance of the company, as 
evaluated by the participants (the assessed governance), is associated with their assessments of the decision 
usefulness of financial accounting information. That is, even though the case company had uniform quality of 
corporate governance, the case company’s governance characteristics could have been viewed differently by 
participants. For example, while some participants may have been reassured by the independent assessment 
of the quality of the case firm’s governance, others could remain sceptical on the grounds that they had 
limited information about the quality of that assessment.
Various analyses indicate that assessed governance is positively associated with assessed representational 
faithfulness. This means that professional investors have fewer concerns about representational faithfulness 
when they regard the corporate governance of the company as strong. Since the case portrays a company 
with relatively strong corporate governance this might also help to explain the previously discussed result 
that compensation-based incentives do not appear to affect the assessment of the decision usefulness of 
accounting. 
Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of this finding. It presents, for each level of assessed corporate 
governance (from 1=very low to 7=very high), the assessed usefulness of accounting information, split into its 
two components: relevance and representational faithfulness. It is clear to see that as the assessed corporate 
governance increases (as one moves towards the right hand side of the graph), so does the assessed 
representational faithfulness of financial reporting information.
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Figure 7 also presents the association between assessed corporate governance and assessed relevance. 
Here, the association is marginally negative, albeit weaker, and therefore, caution should be exerted when 
interpreting this result. Nevertheless, this is an interesting finding. This graphical evidence is consistent with 
financial reporting information generally being of slightly less relevance when corporate governance is strong, 
reducing the demand for monitoring. 
The qualitative evidence gathered in the interviews aids understanding of these associations. As explained 
above, participants were encouraged to explain their assessments of the usefulness of financial statements. 
Consequently, the interviews provide an invaluable source of qualitative material to understand the different 
rationales underpinning the findings. 
Figure 7: Corporate governance and assessed decision usefulness of financial 
accounting information
Notes: 
This graph reports the assessed decision usefulness of financial accounting information, given the 
assessed corporate governance. It is based on the level of agreement with the statement ‘The firm in 
the case faces potentially serious corporate governance issues’. The scale reported here ranks from 
1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree), so that higher values indicate higher levels of assessed 
corporate governance. For each level of assessed corporate governance (from very low=1, to very 
high=7), it presents the average assessed decision usefulness of accounting information.
relevance faithful representation
assessed corporate governance








1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Following the same format of Table 7, Table 8 provides a summary of the topics discussed as a means 
to improve the decision usefulness of financial statements. In particular, it reports how often participants 
mentioned elements associated with the firm architecture of accountability and corporate governance 
(auditing, independent (actuarial) experts, management quality, ownership structure and other corporate 
governance elements (this category is used when participants refer to other elements of corporate governance 
such as boards, audit committees, etc., but also when participants simply refer to corporate governance, 
without isolating any specific element)). Here, and similar to Table 7, the focus is not on the tone, but on how 
frequently topics are discussed in association with the qualitative characteristics of relevance and faithful 
representation, as denoted by the grey colouring scheme.
The evidence reported in Panel A of Table 8 indicates that, overall, corporate governance variables are not 
discussed by the participants in relation to relevance. This is consistent with the graphical evidence presented 
in Figure 7. Indeed, only management quality appears to be associated with the assessed relevance of 
financial reporting information. 
Perhaps as expected, given that half of the sample was asked to assess the performance of management, the 
discussion highlighted that professional investors do consider managerial quality and this perceived quality 
is important when assessing the usefulness of information. Participants sometimes considered it a vital part 
of the information needed to assess the usefulness of financial information, as illustrated by the quote below:
Yes, it is difficult to assess because I don’t know anything of the company management. So, how can I 
evaluate and assess these things? (Sell-side analyst, Italy)
However, such strong statements were rare. Most often, when managerial quality was mentioned, it was 
in the context of discussions with management being important when using accounting information for 
assessing the performance of management. For example, it was mentioned in relation to the confirmatory 
role of accounting, as can be seen in the quote below:
I mean we will look at what management tell us, and we will look at what they have told us in the past. And 
what they actually did. So that can give us some degree of comfort over how reliable management are. 
And we can also look ... or what we do is also look at what they are telling perhaps compared to the way 
the company has performed historically, particularly if it’s a cyclical business, if there are periods of high 
CAPEX, then what’s ... you know: is what they are telling us consistent with where that company [is] in its 
cycle. (Buy-side analyst, UK)
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Table 8 Panel B provides comparative evidence for the representational faithfulness topics. Here, the results 
suggest that corporate governance is perceived as a major factor influencing the extent to which accounting 
information is considered faithfully represented. Auditing, management quality, ownership structure, and 
corporate governance are all important means that lead to a more positive assessment of the representational 
faithfulness of accounting information. Auditing in particular was discussed by participants as being a key 
element of firm corporate governance structure. Indeed, when asked to answer the question ‘It is very likely 
that the financial statements of the case are in full compliance with the relevant accounting standards’, 
a striking 15.79% of interviewees (12 in total) explicitly mentioned auditing (unprompted) as an important 
factor in assessing compliance and faithful representation. This quote from a fund manager may serve as an 
example of this perception:
I have faith in the accounting firm, because it says that it is a well-respected accounting firm, so I don’t 
assume they will make any errors. (Fund manager, Denmark)
A theme that clearly emerged in the interviews is that corporate governance elements are not viewed in 
isolation. The qualitative evidence collected suggests that numerous factors are considered by expert 
investors when assessing the decision usefulness of accounting information. The following quote exemplifies 
this ‘holistic’ view of the company, accounting and its corporate governance:
I think when you’ve got ... you said, an international [audit] firm, and you’ve got professional institutional 
investors, so the combination of those two things ... you probably see, yes, it’s probably going ... 
probably quite a high-standard. (Fund manager, UK)
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Although the evidence indicates a strong positive association between the assessed quality of corporate 
governance and the assessed representational faithfulness, this does not imply that professional investors 
trust blindly or that they do not conduct their own assessments of firm corporate governance mechanisms. 
Indeed, the interviews revealed that it is not unusual for professional investors to withhold complete trust or 
to independently assess the quality of the different corporate governance mechanisms, implying a nuanced, 
detailed understanding of the links between the different corporate governance mechanisms, financial 
information usefulness and managerial incentives and quality. The following quotes provide some useful 
examples along these lines: 
I mean, I would have thought, let’s say, two, based on it’s a leading audit firm, high quality governance, 
you know, but then I wouldn’t give it a one because I’d always assume there might be something in 
there that I hadn’t seen. (Fund manager, UK)
Corporate governance is very important. We actually measure that, we have our own corporate 
governance measurement indicator, and we look at that very closely, and we actually discuss that with 
management. (Fund manager, Switzerland)
Auditing is extremely important. I look at the audited statements, I want to know who is doing it how 
long, how deep is the relationship, and I also want to know whether they are doing other things for 
them. (Buy-side analyst, Switzerland)
Participants also pointed to auditors as being highly important in addressing problems of bias and subjectivity 
around particular line items in the case and in restraining earnings management in general. This was particularly 
when accounting data are implicated in compensation contracts, as the following quotes indicate:
I haven’t got a problem with ‘fair value’, obviously what I have got a problem with are the managerial 
estimates ... the managerial estimates being kind of robustly tested by the auditors. (Sell-side analyst, 
UK)
I still rely on the auditor to have done the job. If they assess this financial statement as being audited 
with no comments and they also give them a high mark on governance, so I think, [the link between 
earnings and compensation] is okay. (Credit analyst, Denmark). 
The latter point is important, because participants displayed a mixture of scepticism and acceptance when it 
came to the likelihood of company managers managing earnings:
Well you have a bonus related to [net income] in this case so that you always have to remind. (Fund 
manager, Sweden)
I am not saying they are cooking the books but what I am saying is that of course you can ... by changing 
very little in your assumptions when making impairment tests on goodwill you can actually get the result 
that you want. (Fund manager, Switzerland)
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They’d be fools if they didn’t [manage earnings]. Of course, it’s their business and it’s a private company, 
so I strongly agree …, and manipulate do I mean they are evil, nefarious people trying to do something? 
Probably not. But are they are human beings who would try to portrait things in the best light? Who 
would exploit the wiggle room that the standards provide to them? Who would exploit the auditors who 
are happy to look in the other direction with no fault being meant to them either? Yes, they would do 
all of these things. There would be manipulation, perhaps also for good reasons. To avoid stupidities in 
the standards … managers could come up with a better disclosure than what the standard suggests. 
(Fund manager, US)
Overall, the quantitative and qualitative evidence indicates that corporate governance matters to ensure 
faithful representation, while having a relatively lower influence on the relevance of financial accounting 
information per se. 
Key points:
• The usefulness of financial reporting information is not assessed in isolation.
• Professional investors view the corporate governance of a firm as a key determinant of the 
representational faithfulness of financial reporting data.
• Corporate governance elements are perceived less important when assessing the value relevance 
of accounting information.
• Corporate governance quality, and particularly audit quality, is viewed as very important when 
assessing the level of compliance with accounting standards.
• Professional investors have a holistic view, whereby elements associated with the firm corporate 
governance, ownership structure, managerial quality, auditing and independent assessment by 
external experts are jointly considered in determining the usefulness of information.
In drawing the analysis chapter to a close, the following interpretation of the role of financial reporting in 
professional investors’ decision making is fitting:
I think that is a more philosophical one but accounts are not only for answering questions but equally as 
much for creating questions in my head. And yes, I get some good questions. (Credit analyst, Denmark)
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Chapter 5
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Research questions addressed in the study
This report presents the key findings of an empirical investigation of the decision usefulness of financial 
reporting information for professional investors making valuation or stewardship decisions. The evidence 
is based on both quantitative and qualitative data obtained from a series of 81 face-to-face interviews with 
professional investors based in 16 countries. In order to solicit investors’ assessments of decision usefulness, 
the interviews were structured around a short fictional case containing abridged financial statement information 
on a large private European manufacturing firm that holds a significant portion of financial investments. To 
derive inferences about the usefulness of financial information, the investors were randomly split, so that 
half of them were asked to use the information contained in the case with the objective of valuing the firm 
(valuation objective), and half of them with the objective of assessing the performance of management 
(stewardship objective). The investors were further divided in half by varying, between participants, how 
managerial compensation was structured: half of the participants were informed that managers in the case, 
were compensated based on accounting information, while the other half were told that managers were 
compensated based on other (non-accounting) information. 
This design permitted causal tests of the following research questions: 
• Does investors’ information acquisition objective, valuation or stewardship, affect the assessed relevance 
of financial accounting information?
• Does the use of accounting information in compensation contracts affect investors’ assessments of the 
representational faithfulness of financial accounting information?
• Do professional investors assess information presented in the income statement and statement of financial 
position to be equally relevant and faithfully represented for the purposes of valuation and stewardship?
• Does professional investors’ decision objective influence the importance of financial reporting information 
relative to other information sources?
• Do professional investors’ assessments of corporate governance mechanisms influence their judgements 
of the usefulness of financial reporting information and, if so, how?
Summary of key findings
The evidence suggests that investors whose objective was to value the firm assess financial accounting 
information to be more relevant than for assessing the performance of management. However, contrary 
to expectations, the existence of accounting-based compensation contracts has no discernible effect on 
representational faithfulness. Subsequent analyses show that the latter result is potentially explained by 
professional investors viewing overall corporate governance, and not single aspects of corporate governance, 
as the key determinant of faithful representation. In line with prior literature, the findings indicate that investors 
view income statement line items as more relevant than statement of financial position (or balance sheet) line 
items, especially if their assigned information objective is to assess managerial performance. 
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The study also shows that, regardless of the information objective, professional investors are very concerned 
with discretion and managerial judgement in financial accounting. It indicates that this discretion reduces 
the representational faithfulness of the statement of financial position line items and, consequently, of 
income statement line items. The in-depth discussions with participants revealed that aspects of a firm’s 
overall corporate governance structure are of particular importance when assessing faithful representation. 
Specifically, compliance with accounting standards was often linked to auditing quality, whilst management 
quality, ownership structure and the overall architecture of accountability provided by a firm’s corporate 
governance mechanisms, as well as by independent assessments from experts such as auditors, were all 
discussed in the context of assessing the representational faithfulness of financial statements information.
Regardless of financial reporting’s shortcomings, the evidence strongly indicates that financial accounting 
information is seen as a key input factor to professional investors’ decision making. This finding is even 
more pronounced when professional investors were asked to assess the performance of management. The 
evidence also strongly confirms that accounting is not used in isolation, as professional investors place 
significant weight on alternative information sources. These alternative information sources include qualitative 
and quantitative non-financial information about the firm and its management, information about the industry 
and competitors, information about product markets, and, to a lesser extent, information about corporate 
governance and the general macro-economic situation. This information originates both from the firm’s 
management and information intermediaries such as financial analysts and rating agencies.
Implications of the research for standard setters
The findings of the study have important implications for standard setting in general and the current debate 
about the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting in particular. First, the research clearly documents 
that the information objective of financial statement users matters for the design of financial accounting 
standards. As the theoretical literature predicts, when investors have the objective of evaluating the 
performance of management, they focus on information that reflects managerial effort and tend to discard 
information that is relevant for the value of a firm but is beyond the control of management, such as macro-
induced valuation gains and losses of financial instruments or in pension liabilities. This implies that standard 
setters should make an explicit statement about potentially conflicting information objectives. One size does 
not therefore fit all and differing objectives require strategies for compromises, such as different measurement 
approaches in the balance sheet and the income statement, with other comprehensive income bridging the 
differences, or otherwise a clear prioritisation of objectives by the standard setter. While the latter is largely 
a political question (e.g., Murphy et al., 2013), it is interesting to note that professional investors attach 
greater weight to financial reporting information when they are assigned a stewardship objective. This hints 
at a competitive advantage for financial reporting when information is demanded for stewardship purposes. 
Combined with the findings of prior research, the results also suggest that properties of information used for 
stewardship, such as high levels of verifiability and informativeness about management effort need promotion 
and protection by standard setters.
Second, confirming the results of prior literature, the findings indicate that professional investors strongly focus 
on the income statement when making decisions. They voice prominent concerns about the representational 
faithfulness of bottom line figures being negatively affected by managerial estimates and judgements triggered 
by valuations that relate to balance sheet line items. This finding should prompt standard setters to reconsider 
what appears to be a predominant elementary focus on the statement of financial position. Also, the general 
focus on the non-GAAP measure EBITDA, combined with concerns about its lack of standardisation and 
comparability, support calls for the development of a standardised set of performance measures for the 
income statement that reflect the differing information needs of users with divergent information objectives. 
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Third, professional investors view the corporate governance of a firm as a (or even the) key determinant of 
the representational faithfulness of financial accounting data. Corporate governance comprises a complex, 
rich set of mechanisms that guarantee that the firm is managed in the best interest of its owners and includes 
elements such as ownership structure, auditing quality or board functioning and composition. Therefore, 
because corporate governance is generally beyond the control of financial accounting standard setters, 
on the one hand, this might call for the standard setters to focus on the relevance of financial accounting 
information. The evidence suggests that, while a minority of investors raise concerns about complexity 
and information overload, the majority believe that additional information and disclosure can enhance the 
relevance of financial accounting information. On the other hand, each recognition and measurement rule has 
an effect on the ‘governance cost’ of faithful representation. 
As an example, historical cost measures are easy to test for completeness and neutrality. Pension liabilities 
and level three fair value estimates of financial instruments, however, are a different story. Based on the 
findings in this study, it would take a far more complex and costly corporate governance regime to ensure 
representationally faithful measurement of the latter. Given that standard setters cater to a wide array of 
divergent preparers, from small and mid-sized private entities to global conglomerates, it seems reasonable 
to discuss the potential requirements for corporate governance and enforcement when evaluating the 
desirability of potential accounting standards and concepts. It might therefore be appropriate to cater to 
different firm types when developing standards.
Implications of the research for preparers
The results of the study also have important implications for preparers of financial reporting information. The 
findings suggest that capital providers consider that accounting-based managerial compensation may create 
incentives for earnings management. Nevertheless, strong overall mechanisms of corporate governance – 
particularly high quality auditing – can ameliorate such concerns, meaning that companies investing in high 
quality governance may well recover their cots through lower perceived risk by key providers of capital.
Implications of the research for academic researchers 
From the perspective of academic research, this study addresses an important question by documenting 
that the assessed relevance of financial accounting information depends on whether the information is used 
for valuation or stewardship purposes, i.e., on the objective of information acquisition. This finding confirms 
predictions from contracting theory and complements prior empirical archival evidence. However, the study 
fails to provide conclusive evidence on the impact of incentives induced by executive compensation contracts 
on the representational faithfulness of financial accounting information. This represents an interesting finding 
in itself and is in line with some of the inconclusive prior empirical archival evidence on the inter-relatedness 
of managerial compensation incentives and earnings management behaviour. Based on the subsequent 
analysis conducted, it is possible that investors evaluate the whole corporate governance regime when 
assessing representational faithfulness and this explains why compensation does not impact the assessment 
of decision usefulness. Also, the study documents some level of basic trust in the representational faithfulness 
of financial accounting data. Finally, since it has been well documented that earnings management incentives 
exist outside compensation contracts, it is not possible to rule out the argument that investors are sceptical, 
regardless of whether managerial pay is based on earnings figures.
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Future research could aim to provide causal evidence for the overall effect of corporate governance on the 
decision usefulness of financial accounting information. Also it seems worthwhile to explore the behavioural 
and rational determinants of trust by professional investors and to see whether the reported findings extend 
to other industries, investor groups and geographic settings. In terms of internal validity and methodological 
triangulation, it would be interesting to implement the study’s research questions in a laboratory experiment 
where participants are incentivised to efficiently complete their objective and their actual use of information 
is observed and evaluated.
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1 Throughout the report, the terms ‘statement of financial position’ and ‘balance sheet’ are used 
interchangeably. 
2 Dichev (2008) notes that under the current approach, assets are regarded as having conceptual priority 
over income and argues that this is inconsistent with how businesses operate and how investors view 
companies.
3 The report avoids using the term decision usefulness in this narrow sense, choosing instead to use it to 
encapsulate both valuation and stewardship decisions.
4 For an illustration of how professional investors’ valuation approaches and models change over time, cf. 
Block (1999) with Brown et al. (2014).
5 The EV/EBITDA ratio is the ratio of enterprise value (i.e., the sum of the values of debt and equity) to 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. The PEG ratio is the price earnings to growth 
ratio, calculated as the quotient of the price/earnings ratio to the expected earnings growth rate.
6 The CFA Institute (2015), however, argues that (other) comprehensive income should be used more by 
investors when assessing firm performance, particularly for banks and financial companies.
7 Interestingly, Healy (1985) shows how the structure of bonus plans means that incentives are not always 
to inflate earnings since some plans have upper and lower bounds which can motivate managers to use 
discretion over accruals to suppress earnings in a given period.
8 Although Bauer et al. (2014) discuss the differences between reliability and representational faithfulness, for 
the purposes of this empirical study this distinction is not maintained and the latter is used in the interest 
of consistency with more recent versions of the Conceptual Framework.
9 Dutta and Zhang (2002) also show that mark-to-market accounting can also be sub-optimal for stewardship 
purposes because it uses only public information rather than private information.
10 Financial reporting quality is measured in a variety of ways in the papers reviewed by Armstrong et al. 
(2010), including the number of enforcement actions by regulators, the level of discretionary accruals, level 
of accounting conservatism and the incidence of accounting errors and misstatements. These measures 
implicitly focus more on the representational faithfulness of financial reporting information than relevance, 
though some studies use the strength of stock market response to earnings as a measure more closely 
related to relevance.
11 Technically stated, the study employs a case-based experimental design, where two aspects of the 
assignment are manipulated: the information acquisition objective and the compensation-based incentives 
of the case, generating four different (2 × 2) conditions. These conditions are administered in a between 
subject design, meaning that each interviewee is randomly assigned to only one condition, and the 
professional investors interviewed are not aware that multiple conditions exist.
12 Due to the need to keep the interview and participants’ reading of the case materials to a reasonable length 
of time, the case information was based on one year’s data and did not include a cash flow statement or 
other comprehensive income (i.e., the assumption was that net income was not necessarily clean surplus 
income). Moreover, the financial instruments in the case were straightforward to understand (a portfolio of 
minority equity investments in unlisted firms), but not necessarily as common as (say) loans or derivatives 
for manufacturing firms. 
13 For the subsequent presentation of the data, values are generally recoded so that higher values indicate 
higher values of decision usefulness. See Appendix 1 for the interview instrument.
Endnotes
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14 Two minor changes were made to the interview guidelines as the study was conducted, neither of which 
affects the case or the experimental design per se. One was a minor change affecting the order of questions 
the other was where additional questions were added at the end of the interview.
15 Although this occurred rarely, in some instances, participants opted not to score items or chose not to 
use the range of values provided (from 1 to 7). This generally linked to concerns about lack of sufficient 
information to rank the item.
16 An important consideration in interpreting these results is that the information in the income statement 
is not independent (e.g., net income is partially dependent on values of revenue), whereas balance sheet 
items are independent of one another.
17 Table A1 in Appendix 2 provides the summary data to accompany Figure 3.
18 Table A2 in Appendix 2 includes the accompanying data for Figure 4.
19 To illustrate this scheme, for the case of property, plant and equipment (PP&E), Table 5 Panel A indicates a 
score of -6 under ‘Predictive role.’ There are eight quotes belonging to eight different interviewees discussing 
issues associated with the predictive role of PP&E. Of those, seven are quotes where participants discuss 
the usefulness of PP&E as being low because of its low predictive role, whilst one quote refers to PP&E as 
having a high predictive role. This leads to PP&E having a net score of -6.
20 It is important to emphasise that participants were not asked about these items specifically; rather, they 
were mentioned in the content of the general discussions.
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Appendix 1: The instrument
Section 1: Experience and education
We would like to ask you a few questions about your experience and personal demographics. These data are 
important to help us understand potential differences in reported answers across groups.
Please briefly characterize your professional occupation _____________________________
Number of years of professional experience overall  ______
Number of years of experience in current occupation  _____
Number of firms you analyse in the average year for investment-related decisions  _____
Do you mainly analyse public (listed) companies or private companies?  _____________
Do your job responsibilities involve some aspect of financial reporting
(besides using it for investment decision making)                       YES         NO
What is your current industry focus, if any? _____________________
What is your current geographic focus, if any? ___________________
Approximate value of funds under your direct management: _________________________
What is your typical investment holding period? _____________________
Approximately how many stocks do you hold? _____________________
Besides your occupation: Do you have any other relevant experience as a professional investor?
Now, we have some very few questions about the firm you are working for
Relative to the size of its competitors, do you consider your firm to be
 VERY LARGE     LARGE     MEDIUM    SMALL      VERY SMALL
Approximate value of funds under management for the whole firm ___________________
Finally, some questions about yourself, Formal background and qualifications (degree, professional 
qualifications)
Highest education______________________________________________________
What is your highest accounting qualification? _______________________________
Sex   ________
Age 20-25     26-30      31-35     36-40      41-45      46-50     51-55      56-60      Over 60
67
Professional investors and the decision usefulness of financial reporting - EFRAG - ICAS Report
Section 2: The case: evaluating the usefulness of financial accounting information
In the following, we will be asking you questions about the decision usefulness of financial accounting 
information. To structure your thoughts, consider the following terminology: usefulness comprises two main 
dimensions: relevance and representational faithfulness. Relevance is the information’s ability to influence 
decision making, assuming that it is faithfully represented. Information is considered to be faithfully represented 
if it is complete, neutral and free from errors.
1. For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items to be relevant:
 1=strongly agree … 4=neither agree nor disagree… 7=strongly disagree
2. For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items to be 
 faithfully represented:
 1=strongly agree … 4=neither agree nor disagree… 7=strongly disagree
3. Overall, for my objective in the case, I assess the financial accounting information overall to be:
 1=strongly agree … 4=neither agree nor disagree… 7=strongly disagree
Revenue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EBITDA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Net income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Property, plant & equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Financial investments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intangible assets (not goodwill) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Goodwill 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pension liabilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Revenue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EBITDA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Net income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Property, plant & equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Financial investments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intangible assets (not goodwill) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Goodwill 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pension liabilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Relevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Faithfully represented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Section 3: The case: additional information that you consider to be useful
4. Besides financial accounting information, what kind of additional information would you like to obtain 




Given your above reply, if you had €100,000 to allocate to obtain this relevant information, please 
indicate how you would assign the money, allocating an amount to the items you identified above as 
well as to improve the decision usefulness of available financial accounting information. 
If you identified fewer than three items, please allocate the €100,000 between the elements identified.
Amount in € allocated 
for obtaining first type 
of additional information 
Amount in € allocated 
for obtaining second 
type of additional 
information
Amount in € allocated 
for obtaining third type 
of additional information
Amount in € allocated 
for improving the 
decision usefulness 
of available financial 
accounting information
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Section 4: Additional questions
Thank you for addressing the questions. Please also answer this short list of additional questions. 
5. It is very likely that the financial statements of the case are in full compliance with the relevant accounting 
standards.
 1=strongly agree… 4=neither agree nor disagree… 7=strongly disagree
6. In the case, managers are likely to manipulate earnings information.
 1=strongly agree… 4=neither agree nor disagree… 7=strongly disagree
7. The firm in the case faces potentially serious corporate governance issues.
 1=strongly agree… 4=neither agree nor disagree… 7=strongly disagree
8. Is your objective in the case to:
 a) Assess the value of the firm
 b) Assess the performance of the management for the current year
9. Is managerial incentivisation in the case based on:
 a) Internal production data
 b) Financial accounting data
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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10. Relevance vs. faithful representation
 Throughout the case, I have asked you to assess the relevance and faithful representation of different 
 financial statement items. Relevance and faithful representation are the two key elements of ‘decision 
 usefulness’ in the conceptual framework of the IFRS. 
 Could you describe the difference between these two elements for me, in your own words?
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________
 Do you find the two elements useful to assess the decision usefulness of financial accounting information?
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________
11. Corporate governance
How important are the following aspects of corporate governance for you when assessing the decision 







• Other governance aspects (please elaborate)
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________
12. Is there any other issue related to the usage of information for decision making in general or the usefulness 
of financial accounting information for decision making in particular that you would like to elaborate on? 
 _______________________________________________________________________
Thank you. This ends the structured interview.
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Table A1: Decision usefulness of financial accounting information: Descriptive evidence 
Panel A: Relevance (1: very low – 7: very high)
Variable Mean SD
Average income statement 5.84 0.88
Average balance sheet 4.58 1.34
Revenue 6.39 1.17
EBITDA 6.01 1.27
Net income 5.11 1.55
Property, plant and equipment 4.16 1.74
Financial instruments 5.12 1.70
Intangible assets (other than goodwill) 4.28 1.94
Goodwill 4.09 2.08
Pension liabilities 5.24 1.52
Variable Mean SD
Average income statement 5.15 1.13
Average balance sheet 4.42 1.16
Revenue 6.00 1.06
EBITDA 5.05 1.62
Net income 4.39 1.73
Property, plant and equipment 5.51 1.35
Financial instruments 4.09 1.74
Intangible assets (other than goodwill) 3.88 1.53
Goodwill 3.80 1.69
Pension liabilities 4.79 1.54
Appendix 2: Additional analysis
Panel B: Representational Faithfulness (1: very low – 7: very high)
Notes: 
This table reports the assessed decision usefulness of financial accounting information for a sample 
of 76 professional investors with complete data.  It is based on the level of agreement with the 
statement ‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items 
to be relevant/faithfully represented’.  The scale reported here ranks from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree), so that higher values indicate higher levels of assessed relevance/representational 
faithfulness. Mean is the average value. SD is the standard deviation of the value. When SD is 
large, it indicates a large dispersion around the average value. When SD is small, it indicates a large 
concentration around the average value.
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Variable Mean SD
Valuation objective/compensation based on internal data (n=15)
Relevance income statement 6.07 0.68
Relevance balance sheet 5.19 1.18
Representational faithfulness income statement 4.76 1.46
Representational faithfulness balance sheet 4.28 1.18
Stewardship objective/compensation based on internal data (n=11)
Relevance income statement 5.97 0.94
Relevance balance sheet 4.58 1.38
Representational faithfulness income statement 5.76 1.17
Representational faithfulness balance sheet 4.76 1.32
Valuation objective/compensation based on financial accounting data (n=15)
Relevance income statement 5.87 1.02
Relevance balance sheet 4.87 0.77
Representational faithfulness income statement 5.56 0.77
Representational faithfulness balance sheet 4.57 1.17
Stewardship objective/compensation based on financial accounting data (n=19)
Relevance income statement 5.88 0.91
Relevance balance sheet 4.48 1.51
Representational faithfulness income statement 5.11 1.14
Representational faithfulness balance sheet 4.61 1.07
Table A2: Experimental results: univariate evidence 
Notes: 
This table reports the assessed decision usefulness of financial accounting information conditional 
on our 2x2 between subject manipulations (information acquisition objective and managerial 
compensation base) for a sample of 60 institutional investors.  The values are based on the level 
of agreement with the statement ‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial 
accounting information items to be relevant/faithfully represented’.  The scale reported here ranks 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), so that higher values indicate higher levels of 
assessed relevance/representational faithfulness. Mean is the average value. SD is the standard 
deviation of the value. When SD is large, it indicates a large dispersion around the average value. 
When SD is small, it indicates a large concentration around the average value.
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EFRAG, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, was established in 2001 with the encouragement 
of the European Commission to provide input into the development of IFRS issued by the IASB and to provide 
the European Commission with technical expertise and advice on accounting matters.
EFRAG is a private sector body established in conformity with Belgian law. The Members of EFRAG - 
collectively known as “EFRAG Member Organisations” - are European Stakeholder Organisations and 
National Organisations having knowledge and interest in the development of IFRS and how they contribute to 
the efficiency of capital markets.
EFRAG’s role as advisor to the European Commission is formalised in a Working Arrangement which states 
that “EFRAG will provide advice to the European Commission on all issues relating to the application of IFRS 
in the EU. In close consultation with the European Commission, EFRAG will participate in the early phases 
of debate on all issues related to the standard-setting process”. As a result, EFRAG’s activities are aimed at 
ensuring that European views on the development of financial reporting are properly and clearly articulated 
in the international standard-setting process, so that ultimately IFRS can be endorsed in Europe to the 
satisfaction of European Stakeholders. Following the implementation of the “Maystadt recommendations” in 
2014, EFRAG’s activities include assessments of whether the IFRS proposals/requirements are conducive to 
the European public good. This includes the interaction with economic concerns such as financial stability 
and growth.
EFRAG is achieving its mission both through its participation in the IASB consultation process and its 
proactive work, and, under the leadership of the European Commission, its interaction with the Accounting 
Regulatory Committee (ARC), to hear about the potential economic or political concerns from Member States’ 
representatives. Upon request, EFRAG also provides the European Commission with technical expertise 
and advice on whether newly published IFRS meet the criteria for endorsement in the European Union, in 
conformity with the 1606-2002 “IAS Regulation”. 
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President and members of the EFRAG Board, to approved EFRAG’s audited financial statements and the 
yearly budget and to modify, when necessary, the EFRAG Statutes and Internal Rules.
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technical positions reached independently, assisted by its ad hoc working groups and advisory panels, albeit 
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EFRAG has established an open and transparent due process, which allows and encourages European 
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http://www.efrag.org/Front/c1-262/EFRAG-Facts.aspx
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